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Abstract  
 
This thesis investigates the brewing 4
th
 era of the international oil market. The 
result of the study shows that we are in a period of uncertainty and change; market 
mechanisms are changing and new key players are emerging. In addition to 
traditional producer National Oil Companies (NOC), the past decade has seen an 
increase of NOCs belonging to states whom are net importers of oil. These 
companies are identified as key drivers of current market changes and case studies 
of these revealed two clusters with regards to their perception of oil. The former 
identifies oil as common pool good and the latter as a toll good. Furthermore 
NOCs have developed from being passive players to vertically and horizontally 
integrated global companies. This thesis argues that the state-private relations 
behind these new NOCs have been powerful tools to overcome market failure of 
imperfect competition. However, the relation to the state appears to be a double-
edged sword, since these NOCs often are part of a broader vision of economic 
growth and are thereby obliged to divert financial and organizational capacity 
towards non-commercial activities. NOCs with large oil reserves have accelerated 
their subsidization and in many cases they have partnered with consumer NOCs 
instead of IOCs. These trends in tandem create a combination of government and 
market failure namely that of imperfect information.  
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Introduction  
 
Few commodities are as fundamental to economic development and 
industrialisation as oil. Nearly all of our modern activities are indirectly or directly 
connected to oil either by transport, manufacturing or heating. There are certainly 
alternatives in the making, hence transitions in energy are slow and willingness to 
do so is doubtful. "While alternative energy sources are increasing, hydrocarbons 
are still projected to dominate energy supply through at least 2030"(National 
Petroleum Council 2007). As the main source of energy it is important for 
consumers, producers and policy makers to understand how the oil market is 
changing. For example, how a shift in market actors cause changes in market 
conditions.   
 
Previous research has left gaps in the literature, especially pertaining to state -
market relationships and institutional governance. This master thesis aims at 
contributing to the collective knowledge of oil market governance and NOCs 
(National Oil Companies) and thereby helps closing those gaps. First of all by 
asking and answering the question of what happened in the 2000s, are we seeing 
an increased influence from state actors than it was a decade ago and if so, 
questioning who these actors are and how they perceive oil. Secondly, by asking 
how strategic choices by these actors affect the supply chain.  
 
Changes in the market will have implications for all actors along the supply chain 
from the citizens of host governments, via companies and states to the end 
consumer. My ambition is that this thesis will be able to give some constructive 
input for actors who try to understand what types of changes are happening in the 
oil market. Even though I cannot predict the future, I hope to be able to give a 
picture of where we are now and how and why we got here.  
 
Acknowledging the time and financial constraints of this master thesis, it is 
evident that I will not be able analyze every detail of every actor. However, I’m 
confident that the data available is rich enough to present general trends in the oil 
market and give a more specific contribution on key players. 
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1. Literature Review 
 
This chapter serves as a theoretical foundation and gives a historical perspective 
of the international oil market. The first section provides a review of concepts and 
theoretical frameworks capturing governance, goods and state-market 
collaboration. The second section summarizes what we know and what we don’t 
know about the history of the oil market until the turn of the millennium.  Lastly 
the two parts are combined in a discussion on shifts in governance structures and 
key players of the international oil market.   
Governance 
The history of the oil market reveals shifts in market power between actors and 
changes in degree of political governance. In order to make sense of this, the first 
clarification ought to be what governance of a market actually is. There are 
several definitions of the concept governance, for example, that of The 
Commission on Global Governance; “the sum of many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private manage their common affairs…it is the continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and 
co-operative action may be taken” (1995). Governance is then a process shared by 
three main sectors; the state, the market and civil society. These sectors are 
intimately associated through an intricate network of connections (Rhodes, 1997; 
Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). In the context of the global oil market these sectors 
have over the past decades shifted in importance and influence. State forces have 
created NOCs to influence the market and have taken regulatory measures to steer 
and in fact create the market itself. At the same time market forces have 
influenced the market by determining prices on the free market exchange and 
private actors serve as clusters of knowledge and investment. Thirdly there are 
non-governmental clusters that influence policy makers and private actors, such as 
think tanks and more activist organizations such as Greenpeace that serve as fire 
alarms. Hence there are also institutional actors like the IEF (International Energy 
Forum) to enhance dialogue among actors.   
 
A strand of scholars, such as Salamon, argues that governance on many arenas 
have moved from the old dynamic of public versus private and has been replaced 
by a convergence of public plus private (1989, 2002). The line between market 
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and state actors has become blurred. Wettenhall argues; "Students of the old 
government-owned enterprises noted that so-called privatizing action frequently 
resulted not in a clear-cut transfers from public sector to the private, but rather to 
mixes of the sort of which Salamon was drawing attention" (2010:20). The aim of 
this thesis is to give a deeper understanding of how different actors interact but 
also the different (perhaps new) means of political governance pursued by state 
actors in order to cope with the changing rules of the game.  
Provision of goods 
Governance can then ultimately be seen as a process to provide a good in the best 
possible way. The shifts in governance can be seen as shifting perceptions among 
key actors as how to provide these goods. These perceptions are often built on 
whether an actor sees the good as a public, private or strategic good. There is a 
well established literature on the provision of public and private goods (Besley 
and Coate 1991, Olson 1965, Epple and Romano 1996) and some with particular 
focus on natural resources and collective action problems related to common-pool 
goods, such as natural resources (Ostrom 2003).However, oil may hold 
characteristics of both types of goods and is therefore also subject to more 
interconnected governance than many other goods. In general terms Ronit and 
Schneider puts it this way; “Some goods and services can only be provided 
through collective efforts coordinated through such non-market devices as 
hierarchies and networks 
1(1999)”.   
 
Oil has strategic concerns which may give rationale for the nation-state to 
intervene in the market. Hence as globalization is making its presence more 
visible, some argue that the nation-state no longer plays a vital role (whether 
voluntarily or not) (Guehenno 1995). Whereas others such as Knill and Lehmkul 
argue that the capability of the state as a viable actor often is underestimated in the 
debate on global governance (2002) and others argue that globalization in fact has 
both strengthening of the nation-state in terms of goods provision (Mann 1997) 
and that the nation-state is just finding new ways to pursue such provision 
(Dicken 2011). Furthermore, some argue that the capacity of both public and 
private actors largely depends on the specific strategic constellation underlying a 
                                                 
1 For example, some goods and services require the exercise of state authority or agreement between governments of states 
in the form of inter-governmental regimes within specific policy sectors and issue areas such as international trade and 
security, more recently also environmental affairs 
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certain policy (or good). ”It is conceivable that the provision of a good is 
determined by the smallest individual contributions i.e. the weakest link”(Knill 
and Lehmkuhl 2002). In terms of the oil market, I wonder if this could be 
transferred to the uncertainty of certain actors (weak links). For example in terms 
of transparency; a weak link (a non-transparent actor) would add strategic 
concerns and thereby increase the rational for state intervention.   
Global governance 
As a result of globalization and international trade most goods belong to some 
form of overarching international regime organizing trade and governance of that 
market, such as the WTO (World Trade Organization). Oil is one of the few 
commodities lacking such a regime. With the formal ending of the Cold War and 
globalization reaching new levels, a strand of global governance scholars emerged 
(Weiss 2000, Murphy 2000, Griffin 2003). Global governance refers to “The 
complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships and 
processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both 
inter- and non-governmental through which collective interests on the global 
plane are articulated. Duties, obligations and privileges are established, and 
differences are mentioned through educated professionals” (Thakur and Weiss 
2006). Early scholars argued that there was a brewing creation of global 
governance in many markets which was tilted in favour of private actors (market 
forces), on behalf of the state (Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair 1999:4).  
 
The global governance literature is also growing on the area of energy (Florini and 
Sovacool 2009, Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). With regards to oil, the debate is 
often centered on how global governance creates friction with realist approaches 
of geopolitics and mercantilist frameworks (Naidu and Davies 2006, Vivoda 
2009). Goldthau and Witte argue that such a state-centered perspective neglects 
not only the fact that market forces matter in international oil and gas markets but 
also the fact that during the past three decades market forces have assumed a 
position of prime importance in determining outcomes in international oil and gas 
markets, driven by reforms that were in many cases driven by producers and 
consumers alike (2009:375).On the other hand there are arguments that we see 
more state in the market and more market in the state. In a more general analysis 
of globalization, there are trends of private market institutions engaged in the 
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creation of international standards, human rights and environmental non-
governmental organizations (Wettenhall 2010:21). However it is equally 
important to recognize that these markets, like any others do not function without 
institutions, which brings us to an IPE (International Political Economy) 
framework for analysis the market. 
An International Political Economy interpretation 
The oil market can be translated into the broader IPE literature, which enables 
analysis of institutional networks and their relations to the functioning of a market 
(Garrett 1998; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). This strand of literature 
stresses that we need to understand a wide range of institutions that affect and are 
affected by a market. These institutions are not simply formal institutions such as 
law and state regulation, but they also include private-sector self-regulatory 
institutions (e.g. professional associations, producer associations) and informal 
institutions such as social conventions (Ha-Joon Chang 2002:552). 
 
What is clear both from this debate as well as from the literature review in general 
is that we are looking at some form of hybrid state-market formation. The strand 
of global governance and IPE is still evolving and gaps are closing. However 
there is still more analysis needed to explain the new forms of energy governance 
(including oil) which should be understood as a patchwork of institutions, 
organizations and regimes, coexisting on various levels of analysis and involving 
both state and non-state actors, and hybrids such as networks or public-private 
partnerships (Florini and Sovacool 2009; Goldthau and Witte 2009, 2010; 
Goldthau, Cherp, and Jewel 2011). 
 
The creation of a truly global market for oil has in a sense handicapped the nation-
state to interact in a traditional state-centered approach. That is not to say that the 
state is dead, but rather that it has taken a new form or found new ways to interact 
(Ruggie 2004, Stone 2008) such new ways include institutional networks and 
transnational cooperation.  
Government and market failures 
Market and government failures relate to a situation in which the market fails to 
efficiently allocate or provide a good or when the government fails to provide a 
good in a way that is Pareto optimal allocation respectively (Anheier 2005). In the 
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governance and provision of goods economists argue that the imperfect nature of 
the state results in government failures in the form of regulatory capture, rent-
seeking and corruption (Ha-Joon Chang 2002:540). Throughout history of the oil 
market, the most debated government failure appears to be that of rent seeking by 
elites. This will be further elaborated on during the sections on the OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) era. Market failures on the 
other hand are commonly acknowledged to take the form of externalities, 
imperfect competition or incomplete information (Goldthau 2012). In terms of the 
oil market, a common debate on market failure is volatility in prices.  
 
The transnational nature of market failures in the global oil market gives rationale 
for global governance. In the oil market it can be hard to define what counts as a 
state intervention (in order to correct for market failures and spillover effects from 
state failures of other states). The interpretation of state intervention differs 
depending on the actors view, and in a way no market is a free market, there is 
always some form of state intervention, after all the market itself is a political 
construct (Ha-Joon Chang 2002). As discussed above, the literature is unclear as 
to what type of good oil actually is, however it does have certain public good 
characteristics, such as externalities from CO2 emissions from using oil.  
Collective action problems associated with the provision of global public good 
have become even more of a challenge, conceptual and practical, than is their 
provision in the national setting (Weiss 2000:810). Other market failures may be 
seen in the lack of investments and uncertainty in energy security. 
Comparable goods 
There is to date little comparison of oil with other goods, most likely because it is 
hard to find another commodity with similar characteristics. Oil is a commodity 
that is traded on the market exchange, while at the same time it’s the backbone of 
economic development and industrialization. Interruption of supply can cause 
societies to a standstill whilst at the same time overuse of fossil fuels can threaten 
the long-term survival of the planet as we know it. State intervention in consumer 
prices comes from opposite directions; some developed countries have applied 
additional taxes on the commodity whereas others, mainly developing countries, 
have chosen to subsidize it. The only commodity that I could argue have some 
similar characteristics would be connectedness (internet/phone connection). In a 
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similar way access to these goods are arguably the key defining characteristics of 
economic development (Florini and Sovacool 2011:66). Hence, an important 
difference between the goods, which also highlights another dynamic of oil, is that 
interconnectedness by no means is rival in consumption. Table 1 shows an 
overview of different types of goods and their characteristics. Interconnectedness 
then falls in the category of toll goods. It is non-rival because it doesn’t matter 
how many people are using it, hence it is excludable since it is possible to charge 
a fee for usage.  
Table 1 Public and private goods 
 Non-excludable  Excludable  
Non-rival Pure public good Quasi- public : Toll good 
Rival   Quasi-public: Common pool Pure private good 
 
Oil may be considered as non-excludable by certain actors, due to that in some 
countries it is viewed as a natural resource, like a forest or a sea, it should be free 
of charge (or in at least very close to free). Whereas other actors may view it as a 
private good, hence due to its economic and political importance it is given 
strategic concerns. The essence is that oil has both public and private good 
characteristics, such as non-rival ideological concerns and non-excludability as a 
strategic concern for economic prosperity. Furthermore, what gives oil another 
complicated dimension is the fact that investments are uncertain and it takes a 
long time to find, extract and transform these molecules from the ground to the 
fuel that runs the engine of a car. Meaning that changes to the market, by any 
actor, require time and stamina.   
Collaborative Governance 
Another strand of governance literature which is relevant for the oil market is that 
on collaborative governance, which relates to the process of bringing public and 
private stakeholders together in collective forums. These forums come in a variety 
of forms, hence often with the aim of reaching and engaging in consensus 
building. Another characteristic is that these collective forums tend to take the 
form of either coordination or collaboration (Thynne 2008). A reoccurring 
obstacle is the power imbalance that appears when important stakeholders lack 
organizational infrastructure to participate in the institutional framework  (Ansell 
och Gash 2007). Throughout the past decades, there has been a range of different 
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rationales for these partnerships, starting with government regulation of business 
in the 1970s, to regional and urban dynamics of the 1950s, to New public 
Management of the 1980s, to strategic management and public governance of the 
1990s (Wettenhall 2010:36). This strand of literature mainly relates to a national 
setting, which is visualised through relationships between oil companies and 
governments in the oil market. However, collaborative governance can also be 
transferred to the global oil market where emerging arenas and institutional 
frameworks are incorporating both state and market actors. However, as the 
literature suggests there are often obstacles and imbalances in capacity among 
these different actors (Anheier, 2005).  
Theoretical tools 
The paragraphs above have covered vast theoretical grounds; there are different 
concepts and theories which can explain the governance and ultimately the 
provision of oil as a good. The next section provides a brief history of the 
international oil market. In the final section of this chapter the theory and history 
are combined in an analysis of key actors.   
The history of oil governance 
The beginning of oil 
Oil production took off in the United States in the mid 1850s, hence this literature 
review has its starting point at the end of WWII due to the uncontroversial nature 
of the prewar structure. However, the most extensive documentation of the prewar 
period can be found in Yergin’s book The Prize: The epic quest for power, money 
and oil. In great detail the author guides the reader through the rise and fall of 
Standard Oil, the importance of Baku, how oil changed the WWI, the clever 
maneuver of Mr. five percent and the adventure of Rockefeller. Furthermore 
Yergin explains the prevailing model of the American oil industry at the middle of 
the century. The underlying assumptions of that system were that the demand for 
oil would not be significantly sensitive to price movements and that each state 
should have its natural share of the market.  
State-centrism in the postwar oil market 
After WWII the importance of oil and its significance to power and economic 
growth was realized among politicians across the globe. Oil had changed the rules 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                02.09.2013 
Page 9 
of war and became a matter of winning or losing. During the war, tremendous 
efforts were assigned to securing oil supplies to your own army as well as cutting 
your enemies supply.  
 
The decades following the war were dominated by a state-centered approach in oil 
market governance. First it was dominated by IOCs (International Oil Companies) 
from the Western world and later by producer government’s trough the 
OPEC(Yergin 1991:500). The widespread drive towards state intervention in the 
oil market following WWII was mainly supported by three arguments among the 
OECD (Organization for Economic, Cooperation and Development) countries; 
market failure, the Keynesian legacy and the Soviet example (Stevens 2008). In 
more general terms a state-centered approach is based on two assumptions. The 
first assumption is that in some cases protectionism can raise social welfare. 
Whereas the second assumption states that governments can operate independent 
from interest group pressure(Oatley 2012).  
 
The seven sisters 
 
In 1948 the U.S became a net importer of oil and the western world (including  
Japan) were dependent on IOCs to supply sufficient supplies of "foreign oil" to 
cover domestic demand (Yergin 1991). The most important IOCs in securing that 
supply came to be called the seven sisters and in the immediate period after the 
WWII they were the majors of the global oil market(Claes 2001). The steady 
increase in demand and low production costs in the Middle East generated great 
profits for the seven sisters and security of supply for western governments.  
 
The seven sisters were the "Anglo-Iranian oil company, the four Aramco partners- 
Jersey, Socony, Texaco and Standard of California- plus Gulf, which was Anglo-
Iranian’s partner in Kuwait; Shell, which was tied to Gulf in Kuwait; and the 
French company, CFP. The American and British governments were also 
intimately involved" (Yergin 1991:476).What they had in common was that they 
all were involved in large scale joint ventures in the Middle East and through a 
consortium they controlled almost the entire industry. The Seven sisters controlled 
the entire upstream segment and host governments were mainly perceived as 
passive players engaged in the industry as competing sellers of licenses or oil 
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concessions. However in the domestic downstream segment of western markets 
competition over consumers could be fierce (Fattouh and Van der Linde 2011: 
26). 
 
In the decades to come resource rich nations developed a state centered approach 
that would have vast consequences for the seven sisters. Already before the WWII 
a new form of resource nationalism had started. For example, in 1938 the 
nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry and the creation of Pemex would come to 
serve as a role model for other resource rich countries across the globe (Jaffe and 
Soligo 2010). In addition there were three other factors that were very important 
for how the industry would develop; the rise of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over 
natural resources, dissatisfaction with the concession terms agreed in the previous 
period and rising oil demand (Stevens 2008). 
 
The main battle between these two "blocks" (seven sisters and host governments) 
was about economic rent. Rents had a much greater meaning to many of the host 
governments than its meaning in pure financial terms; it was also a matter of 
sovereignty and nation building. Host-governments were eager to show the world 
and in many cases its own population the power, influence, significance and status 
these resources gave the country. This was an opportunity to build a strong nation-
state based on power and pride (Yergin 1991:431). For the consuming nations that 
had put their faith in the hands of the IOCs joined the battle for strategic reasons. 
They all understood that they needed to secure supplies of oil in order to grow 
economically and for many oil was also a great source of direct and indirect taxes 
(Yergin 1991:433). 
 
There was a great dissatisfaction among the producing countries over the 
distribution of profits from the industry. In many cases IOCs paid more in taxes 
on consumer markets than they did in royalties to host governments. An event that 
really marked a shift in the battle was the Saudi-Aramco fifty-fifty deal in 1950. 
When the Saudi-Aramco deal was struck it opened up a door for new 
arrangements in the distribution of rents. The era of the seven sisters were broken 
down by several factors, increased competition, lack of unity and the argument 
that has received the most literature; the establishment of OPEC. 
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The era of OPEC 
 
The major reason for the creation of OPEC was a growing anger towards the 
IOCs. IOCs were cutting posted prices simultaneously as it was the posted price 
that was the basis for the producer countries taxes and royalties (Claes 2001). In a 
Gentlemen´s agreement leading up to the creation of OPEC, a leading figure, 
Perez Alfonzo urged that the concerned countries should defend the price 
structure and establish NOCs. It was also urged to build domestic capacity to 
move further along the value chain, in particular downstream and into refining. 
A major shift in power in OPECs favor happened in 1971 through two agreements 
signed between OPEC members and IOCs. These agreements marked a significant 
shift because they covered topics such as tax and price increases, inflation 
compensation and fixing of such rates for future years. "The effects of the 
agreements were a 21 percent price increase for Saudi Arabian crude (from $1.80 
to $2.18), and an increase in revenue of 38.9 percent"(Claes 2001:63).  
 
The nationalization of resources in the 1970s was in many cases also rooted on a 
much deeper level. Both the creation of NOCs and the creation of OPEC was for 
Latin American, African and Middle Eastern producing countries a way to affirm 
their independence in relation to foreign interests and an assertion of 
independence (Noreng 2006). The postwar period did not only see an increase in 
demand but also in supply. In the beginning of the 1970s most nations in which 
supplies were found created a NOC. By October 1973producer governments took 
over the prerogative of oil prices and unilaterally announced increases to the price, 
this was the first oil shock (Stevens 2008). 
 
The first oil crisis quickly spread across the globe and it was a result of OPEC´s, 
Syria´s and Tunisia´s response to the third Israeli-Arab war through a proclaimed 
oil embargo; it was “in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli 
military”. The embargo lasted until March 1974 and during this period the price of 
oil increased from $3 to $12 per barrel. The oil embargo signaled a new era for oil 
and the years that followed, 1974-1978 can be seen as the golden years of OPEC 
(Yergin 1991).  
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From 1983-1984 OPECs role as a price setter started to be diminished for two 
major reasons; first, a halt in oil demand due to the economic downturn and a 
huge inventory dump which now was considered unnecessary and secondly new 
producer competition outside of OPEC(Claes 2001). In March 1982 OPEC 
reduced its quota in order to maintain the price, but it was the end of an era. 
Furthermore, the way that OPEC influenced the oil market in its golden years and 
up until the mid 1980s can be characterized by price setting whereas since 1986 
the strategy has been producing quotas (Wirl 2012).  
Oil as a private commodity 
In the 1980s there was a shift towards a more market oriented approach. "As was 
said, sometimes with approval and sometimes with horror, oil was becoming, just 
another commodity "(Yergin 1991:721). Oil was no longer considered a strategic 
good which had to be under state control, but rather a commercial commodity 
with private good characteristics. The Washington consensus and the fall of the 
Soviet Union finalized the arguments for privatization and deregulation. The 
Washington consensus symbolized an ideological swing away from government 
involvement in the economy and the oil market.  Furthermore it was argued that 
NOCs had the potential to become too powerful in domestic politics (Stevens 
2008).The early 1980s can be seen as the shift away from a statist paradigm and 
towards a liberal paradigm based on deregulation and privatization of the oil 
industry. The new policy agenda was to make oil a private good governed by free 
market exchange (Goldthau 2012).  
 
The era of liberalism conquered the western world and with it came a wave of 
privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), some of which were large 
energy companies (Parra 2010). Furthermore NOCs were criticized for being 
ineffective due to conflicting objectives imposed by governments and rent seeking 
bureaucrats (Stevens 2008). “The development of new oil in Alaska and the North 
Sea played an important role in the recovery of many companies as significant 
market players, helping them to regain some of their market power in the rather 
stagnant oil market of the late 1970s and first part of the1980s”(Fattouh and Van 
der Linde 2011:39). 
 
 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                02.09.2013 
Page 13 
The market as price setter 
 
During the 1980s the entire pricing system had changed, in the late 1970s crude 
sales were nearly exclusively long-term contracts whereas by 1985 seventy 
percent of sales were based on spot price (Claes 2001). Saudi Arabia started to 
pursue netback pricing and the futures and forward markets exploded; this meant 
at least in the short term that it was market traders that decided the price of oil.  
By mid 1980s North Sea crudes, particularly Brent, was a major feature of an 
increasingly price-transparent market. Parra argues that this was visualized in two 
trends, firstly the Dated Brent was a feature of making the spot market an 
integrated part of the supply channel and secondly  Brent became a “marker” 
crude. Contract prices of other crudes came to be fixed by reference to the price of 
Brent, subject to appropriate adjustments for quality and location (2010).From 
1987 Saudi Arabia started to set crude prices monthly in advance according to a 
formula. World oil prices has since been set by reference to the prices of the 
marker crudes; Brent, WTI and Dubai. Furthermore Parra argues that OPEC still 
played a role in price setting but now without precision. OPEC continued to set 
producing quotas, but the effectiveness and outcome was highly uncertain. As for 
demand, it did not reach back to peak levels until 1989.  
 
The Gulf War was a turning point in producer-consumer relations, most likely 
because it proved how sensitive the global market still was to such supply shocks. 
On October 1, 1990 in the UN General Assembly, the Venezuelan President Perez 
called for an urgent meeting of producers and consumers. He claimed that the 
arrangement at the time only would favor speculators and opened up for a 
dialogue between OPEC and the International Energy Agency (IEA). The first 
meeting took place in Paris in the summer of 1991 and these meeting are now held 
on an annual basis under the name of the IEF(Fattouh and van der Linde 2011). 
 
Market concentration  
 
Throughout the 1990s both financial and physical reserves were to be 
concentrated among fewer companies. This trend of mergers and acquisitions 
intensified at the turn of the next decade; from 45 IOCs in 1998 only 16 remained 
in 2004(Claes 2001:85). What had unfolded in these years was one of the most 
significant restructurings in the history of oil. The companies that came out of 
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mergers were not only bigger but also capable of larger and more complex 
projects than ever before (Yergin 2011:105).  Another trend in the industry was 
streamlining, which is the process where company´s focus on the core business, in 
this case oil, gas and chemicals (Parra 2010).  In conjunction and correlated with 
the industrial concentration three realities appeared. First there was a growing 
importance of attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) as the basis of 
development strategy. Secondly, a low oil price following from the collapse in 
1986. Thirdly, it was manifested that oil from now on would be coming out of a 
much more difficult geography and geology (Stevens 2008).   
 
The 1990s also opened up new opportunities, in particular the opening of the 
Soviet Union. The Caspian basin offered great opportunities for development and 
today this region produces four times of what they were just a decade ago. “Today 
the total output of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is 2.8 million barrels of oil, 
equivalent to more than 80 percent of North Sea production”(Yergin 2011:82). 
Below is a summary of the governance of the international oil market and key 
actors that are seen as drivers of change.  
Governance of the international oil market 
The oil market has been through some distinct shifts in governance, the state-led 
approach was blooming in the post-war period, reaching a peak by 
nationalizations of the oil reserves in the 1970s. The market led-approach have 
been on the agenda since the late 1980s, triggered by the Washington consensus 
and a paradigm shift in overall economic and social policies characterized by 
liberalization and deregulation.   
 
The perception of oil as a good has also changed over time and among actors, the 
state-led approached emphasized public goods characteristics of the good, both on 
producer and consumer side, in at least a more strategic view on the good. 
Whereas demand, supply and the market exchange has been the trusted tools for 
setting a global equilibrium price of oil since the governance shift in the late 
1980s. Global governance has not received much attention in previous eras and 
throughout history there have been a lack of forums for a global dialogue. In the 
1990s, we can see more dialogue through the IEF, which involves IEA and OPEC.  
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State failures such as rent distributions and market failures such as lack of 
information and volatile prices has historically been problematic and state 
solutions of the post war era and market solutions of the 1990s mirror different 
beliefs among actors. This thesis investigates how the new era of the oil market is 
governed, first by looking at how market fundamentals have changed,  secondly 
by investigating NOCs of the new market players and third the consequences of 
the new approaches by these actors by looking at vertical and horizontal 
integration. 
Key drivers  
Behind the shifts discussed above there are a few market players that can be 
characterized as key drivers of change. Actors that want to change the status quo 
of how the market is arranged. In the post war period it was the seven sisters who 
created a state-led approach abroad in order to create security of supply, yet 
trusting market actors to provide the good in the domestic market and believing in 
competition to bring the right price. This period was followed by a different state-
led approach, led by the OPEC countries. Security of supply was not the strategic 
concern; rather it was ideology and domestic politics. Lastly from the 1990s, the 
new super majors, such as Shell and BP emerged as the key drivers of change, 
they viewed oil more as a private good and reinforced the position of market-led 
actors and the use of the market-exchange mechanism to be the price setter. Table 
2 visualizes a brief overview of the shifts described above, the history is of course 
much more complex, hence it gives an idea of how the components are linked and 
why this thesis is structured the way it is.  
 
Table 2 Eras of the oil market and key actors  
Era Key actors  Good Motive  Consequence 
Post war period  Seven sisters Strategic  Security of supply Demand side 
capture economic 
rent  
1970s- 1980s OPEC Strategic  Nationalism, 
economic rent, 
politics  
Supply side capture 
economic rent 
1980s-1990s BP, Shell, Exxon 
etc.  
Private good Efficiency  Market 
concentration, price 
volatility   
2000s ? (chapter 3) ? (chapter 4) ? (chapter 4 &5 ) ? (chapter 5&6) 
 
GRA 19003 Master Thesis                                                                02.09.2013 
Page 16 
As table 2 indicates, in order to understand current changes in the market and 
possible scenarios for the future we ought to understand who these new key 
players may be and what their motives and strategies are.  The major question and 
the theme of this thesis is then whether these key drivers are adapting strategies 
that are either strengthening or correcting for market and state failures.  
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2. Research Questions and Design 
 
In order to formulate researchable and relevant questions it is important to locate 
the current research frontier.  As governance of the oil market is the central theme 
of the thesis, the research frontier of the previously mentioned clusters of 
governance; state actors, market actors and the institutional network are relevant. 
The following paragraphs present the research frontier on all three of these.  
The research frontier  
The first decade of the millennium has meant vast changes for the oil industry, 
hence there is still confusion among the research community as in which direction 
the market is moving.   
 
State actors  
Several researchers indicate that there is a stronger presence from state actors than 
it was in the 1990s, hence not operated in same statist approach as we have seen 
before (Harks 2010; Goldthau 2012). The most common way for the state to 
intervene in the market appears to be by creating and maintaining a NOC (Youngs 
2009; Umbach 2010; Henderson 2012). In particular, attention has been given to 
consumer NOCs (James Baker Institute 2007; World Bank 2007;  PESD 2012) 
since they appear to be gaining market power. These companies are also 
connected to a wider debate on resource nationalism (Jaffe and Soligo 2010; 
Beeson, Soko and Young 2011) and investments in capacity building that is 
needed to meet the rising demand. Furthermore debates on state actors’ role in 
peak oil and transparency continue (Noreng 2012).  
 
Market players  
For the first nine months of 2012 Asian NOCs spent $ 37 billion acquiring assets 
outside their home market and there are no signs of slowing down (Ernst & 
Young 2012:1) (Beeson, Soko and Young 2011). Asia and in particular China has 
received a fair amount of attention in recent literature. There is no doubt that 
China will play a more important role in world politics in the years to come and 
thereby also in energy politics. Throughout the past decade China´s ‘going out’ 
strategy has received particular attention and there is still confusion as to how the 
relationship between the state and Chinese NOCs actually is functioning. Apart 
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from a rising demand, the oil price has also been debated (Taylor 2006; Zigler 
2008). After almost a decade of increasing oil prices, the years after the financial 
crisis have been characterized by price volatility and the explanation ranges from 
Peak Oil (Raphael and Stokes), cheap peak oil (Noreng 2012), lack of investments 
(Fattouh Van der Linde 2011; Radetzki 2012) to financial speculation  (Bressand 
2010;Yergin 2011).  
 
Institutional network 
The new dynamics of the oil market appears to have triggered new dynamics and 
relationships as well as new risks and opportunities (Xu 2007). Oil lacks a clear 
institutional framework, as opposed to many other goods it is not under the WTO 
or any other such international regime (Goldthau 2012). Therefore most research 
is focused on the different parts of the institutional network, such as the 
consumer-producer dialogue through the IEF or transparency issues through for 
example JODI (Joint organization Data Initiative) (IEA 2008; Kohl 2010; Benner 
and Soares de Oliviera 2010; Van der Linde and Luciani 2012).  
Research objectives and questions 
The objective of this thesis is three-fold, firstly to give an understanding of 
changes in governance and market conditions of the oil market since mid 1990s 
and thereby identify key players in the new paradigm. The second objective is to 
get a deeper understanding of the motivations of new key players. The third 
objective is to analyse the consequences of these changes and motivations. These 
objectives then result in a three more specific questions. 
 
The first research question is two-fold;  
1a How have market conditions of the oil market changed over the past decade? 
1b Who are the key drivers of these changes? 
 
In order to get an understanding of how the market conditions of the oil market 
has changed, the thesis will thoroughly analyse the research frontier and present 
key changes in state, market and institutional actors and then interpret these in 
terms of market conditions; multiple actors, transparency, entry barriers and price-
setting. Furthermore, these findings will help to locate the key drivers behind 
these changes, just as we saw in chapter one, there have been some key drivers 
behind each paradigm in the past.  
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Chapter one also revealed that an important factor for changes in the oil market is 
the perception of oil among key actors, for example, do key actors view it as a 
public or a private good. Therefore the second research question is;  
 
2.What type of good is oil in the eyes of key drivers of change? 
 
The third research question relates to visible consequences of the findings in 
question one and two. From the literature review it is already clear that these key 
drivers will be NOCs and this thesis is determined to close the knowledge gap on 
how these NOCs behave in terms of vertical integration and strategic alliances. A 
combination of these two facts, gives the third research question;  
 
     3.What are the visible consequences of the new key drivers in terms of vertical and horizontal 
integration? 
 
This third part is important since it is one of the few visible trends we can see of 
the brewing new era of the oil market. Figure 1 visualizes the research design and 
the underlying logic.  
Figure 1 Research design and overview 
 
1. Changes  
• How have market conditions of the oil market changed over the past decade?  
• Outcome: 
• Identify changes in demand and supply side actors  
• Identify changes in transparency  
• Identify changes in regulatory measures  
• Identify changes in single actor market power 
• Who are the key drivers of these changes?  
2. Motive  
•  What type of good is oil in the eyes of key drivers of change? 
• Outcome: Identify motivations of state intervention in terms of goods provision  
3. 
Consequences 
 
• What are the visible consequences of the new key drivers in terms of vertical and horizontal integration? 
• Outcome: Identify consequences of those motivations in terms of vertical integration   
• Outcome: Identify consequences of those motivations in terms of horizontal integration 
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Analytical framework  
1a. How have market conditions of the oil market changed over the past 
decade?  
1b. Who are the key drivers of these changes?  
From the literature review in chapter one it is clear that the oil market has always 
been of a hybrid character with influences from the state, the market and 
institutions/organizations. Over periods these actors have increased and decreased 
their influence, creating consequences for market conditions, such as competition, 
transparency and price-setting.  The analytical tools used to answer these 
questions will be firstly through a literature review of governance in the new 
millennium and secondly interpreting the findings in terms of the market 
conditions of the free market hypothesis.  
 
In economic theory, a commodity left entirely to market forces will have its price 
and quantity determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand, this argument 
started from Adam Smith and has developed through the last centuries and is to 
today the basics of any introductory microeconomics class. In order to analyze the 
changes of political interference with the market this analysis will use the 
conditions of a perfect competition as indicators. The perfect market hypothesis 
says that a commodity is in perfect competition of free trade if the following 
characteristics prevail (Aumann, 1966 et.al):  
 
1. A homogenous good  
2. Multiple actors on both demand and supply side (No monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly etc.) 
3. All participants have the same information.  
4. Low barriers to entry  
5. All participants are price takers  
 
When all these conditions are in place, we have perfect competition according to 
economic theory. From now on, I will treat them as indicators, due to that the first 
condition has not changed in the past ten years I will treat it as a constant.  
I1= Multiple actors: Measured by the possibility for consumers to diversify their 
supply and for producers to sell to a variety of consumers. 
I2 = Information: The availability of information on reserves, production and trade as 
well as transparency of transactions.  
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I3= Entry barriers: What are the most significant entry barriers today compared to a 
decade ago.  
I4= Price takers: If both supply side and demand side actors are price takers, if no 
actor alone can change the price by disrupting supply or change the demand.  
 
Drawing from the literature review I will not find perfect competition. However, 
what I will be able to extract is changes in the state-centered and market-led 
approaches, some indicators may have decreased whereas others have increased 
and in turn this will have consequences for market mechanisms. By using the 
variables of the free market, I expect to find not only whether the state has more 
control over the oil market, but perhaps more interestingly on what variables it 
changes over time and how. Furthermore, based on this analysis, key actors of the 
changes in market mechanisms will be identified. These actors are identified by 
looking at the changes as well as market data on leading oil companies.  
2. What type of good is oil in the eyes of key drivers of change?  
 
The core of the analysis is the underlying motivations of these actors and how 
they perceive that provision of oil as a good should be carried out. Therefore the 
final analysis is drawn on goods theory. However, in order to be able to do that I 
will first analyse the six cases in terms of corporate governance, domestic 
monopoly and non-commercial activities. The selection of the six NOCs to be 
analysed are drawn from the analysis in chapter 3 on governance of the oil market. 
The NOCs selected are identified as plausible drivers of change in the brewing 
paradigm.   
 
The three evaluation criteria are corporate governance, domestic monopoly and 
non-commercial activities. These three dimensions will capture different aspects 
of goods provision. The governance structure will indicate whether state or market 
actors are preferred to secure supplies. Corporate governance will we evaluated on 
whether the NOCs behave more as a private enterprise or as an arm of the 
government.  The domestic market will reveal whether key players believes that 
competition or monopoly is the preferred market set up for exploring domestic 
resources, it may also reveal natural monopolies. The evaluation criteria therefore 
relate to market share and dominance in the domestic market (and in case of 
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monopoly whether it is created by the government or if it is a natural monopoly). 
The non- commercial activities will reveal whether there are other public goods 
characteristics, such as redistributive effects. Non-commercial activities are 
evaluated on their significance and consistency.   
 
If actors view oil as a pure private good we would expect no state interference. 
Whereas if viewed as a public good it should be non-rival and non excludable, oil 
does not hold these characteristics. However, there might be states that treat oil as 
a good with some public good characteristics. There might be states that may 
consider it so vital to economic prosperity or pressure from the public that it 
should be subsidized, so that it is nearly free of charge. This part is a way to 
translate the findings of changes into motives.  
3 What are the visible consequences of the new key drivers in terms of vertical 
and horizontal integration?  
 
The third part is related to how these motives turn into consequences both for the 
actors that conduct them and for non-state actors in forms of vertical and 
horizontal integration. There are three major segments in the value chain of the oil 
market:  
Figure 2 Vertical Integration 
       Upstream                               Midstream         Downstream 
 
I 
 
If a company is pursuing a strategy of vertical integration, they try to capture more 
segments than previously, for example a company that historically have been 
involved in Exploration in the upstream phase, decide to move into the business of 
refining the crude oil (transformation) in the midstream segment. In order to 
answer the question at hand, I will analyze then NOCs of the six case studies. This 
section will therefore be a comparative study over the past fifteen years.   
 
Strategic alliances are formal agreements between firms to pursue a specific 
strategic objective; to enable firms to achieve a specific goal that they cannot 
achieve on their own by horizontal integration. It involves the sharing of risks as 
Inputs  Transformation   Distribution  Consumption 
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well as rewards through joint decision making responsibility for a specific 
venture. Three major models of horizontal integration exists; research oriented, 
technology oriented and market oriented (Dicken 2011:156).  The section on 
horizontal integration will mirror that of vertical integration. It will be a 
comparative study, with the same NOCs and time frames.   
Data 
Data is gathered from a wide variety of secondary sources, the first part drawing 
more on journal articles due to the literature review format, whereas the core of 
the second part is the six cases and thereby are company/country related and most 
data is drawn from annual company reports and industry reports.  
 
The first research question is answered by first presenting an extensive literature 
review and secondly by analyzing the findings in terms of market mechanisms. 
The literature review itself consists of three dimensions, the state, the market and 
institutional networks. Sources to analyze the changes in state governance of the 
oil market are drawn from industry reports by Ernst & Young, IEA and IEF, 
publications of books and journal articles by frontier scholars such as Youngs and 
Harks. Furthermore three series of case studies on NOCs are introduced and these 
will be important sources throughout the thesis. They are written by James Baker 
Institute, World Bank and PESD (Program on Energy and Sustainable 
Development).  
 
In addition to the sources above, research and debates on the role of market actors 
are analyzed by using data from BP statistical review and Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly.  As in the case of state actors, this section tries to capture the main 
debates of the research frontier over the past decade, therefore contributions from 
scholars such as Yergin and Noreng as well as articles from journals such as 
Energy Policy, Global policy and International Affairs. There are also industry 
and market reports by IEF and the World Bank.  
 
For the institutional infrastructure, the main point is that there is not that much 
research done due to the lack of a global institutional regime for oil. Hence, there 
has been some research on voluntary cooperation through JODI and EITI 
(Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) by frontier scholars such as 
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Goldthau, Florini, Harks and Eigen. There is also some research on regulatory 
frameworks by organizations such as IEF, OPEC, WTO and WPC (World 
Petroleum Council). Therefore this section draws secondary data from all of these 
sources in order to be able to present as a broad and accurate view of the 
institutional patchwork as possible.  
 
Chapter four and five are based on the six case studies, the former focuses on 
goods provision and the latter on commercial integration of NOCs. Chapter four is 
based on the three cases studies previously mentioned as well as company and 
government reports. Similarly chapter five focuses on domestic and international 
mergers and acquisitions therefore annual reports from NOCs and industry 
expert’s serves as the core of the data set. The NOCs analyzed are great 
enterprises with vast amounts of subsidiaries; I therefore would like to raise a 
concern that the data on vertical and horizontal integration may have minor 
reliability flaws due to missing data as a consequence of lack of transparency. 
However, I’m confident that approach taken is of high validity for what is 
measured and that more than enough data is gathered in order to be able to show 
accurate and significant trends and answer the questions at hand in the best 
possible way.  
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3. The international oil market in the 2000s 
 
This chapter analyses the changes in governance, market mechanisms and key 
players over the past decade. The chapter has three main sections, the first 
summarises major debates and key changes by analysing three clusters of actors; 
state, market and institutions. The second part interprets these findings by looking 
at the free market hypothesis and thereby identifies and captures movements in 
the number of actors, transparency, entry barriers and price-setting.  The third part 
of the chapter presents the case selection of key drivers for chapter four and five.  
 
Governance of the international oil market 
The governance of a market is a set of processes and mechanisms chosen to 
provide a good and is collaborated among three types of actors; state, market and 
institutions. The sections below present a literature review on major debates and 
research findings regarding these different actors in the past decade.  
State  
Presented below are the major scholarly debates on the changing role of state in 
the oil market. The literature focuses on three main themes; resource nationalism, 
strategic reserves and NOCs.  
 
Resource nationalism  
 
Estimations show that roughly 90 percent of all oil resources on the planet have 
been nationalized; this creates a major entry barrier for oil companies trying to 
establish themselves in new markets. Every year the consultancy company Ernst 
& Young presents the main opportunities and risks in the oil market. For 2011 
access to reserves was listed as the main risk followed by political constraints and 
competition for proven reserves. "Indeed, our multi-sector survey found that oil 
and gas respondents were more likely than those in any other sector to report 
difficulties in managing the risks associated with the expansion of government’s 
role"(Ernst & Young 2011:4). At this point there are few known oil resources that 
have not been nationalized and therefore government policies of countries holding 
these reserves constitute a major entry barrier. Today the share of oil reserves 
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available for IOCs is very small, its considered to be less than 10 percent (IEF 
2012:5). 
 
The debate on resource nationalism has triggered concerns among countries not 
holding any significant reserves such as the member states of the European Union 
(EU). They have received attention for their lack of state interference in the oil 
market and the debate often belongs to a wider debate of whether or not the EU 
should have a common energy policy and whether it is nation-states or the 
European commission that should provide energy security. European companies 
have found themselves in fierce competition with both producer NOCs and Asian 
investors (Youngs 2009:169). Some argue that the so called new “resource 
nationalism” gives the EU a reason to protect itself, not necessarily by creating 
NOCs but at least to take a more active role (Umbach 2010:1239). This could also 
be a space for improved of economic and political integration that strengthens 
cohesion of its members. However to date the EU institutions have not played a 
role in securing this strategic resource, and European vulnerability is far too high 
(Palazulelos and  Fernandez 2012:280).  
 
Spare capacity and strategic reserves 
 
In order to protect from supply interruptions major consumers such as the IEA 
countries and China have started to hold strategic reserves. For example, a 
requirement for members of the EU is to hold a 90 day reserve and many other 
consuming nations have started similar initiatives. Strategic reserves were for 
example used to make up for supply shortages during hurricane Katrina.  
 
There is a similar concept on the supply side, that of spare capacity. Spare 
capacity is defined as capacity that can be brought on-stream within thirty days 
and remain sustainable for at least ninety days (IEA 2008a).  For example it was 
used during the strikes
2
 in the winter 2002/2003 in Venezuela (at the time the 3
rd
 
biggest producer in the world) as well as during the invasion of Iraq in March 
2003 (ibid). However, as a result of a growing demand for oil, spare capacity 
                                                 
2 “In 2002 the Venezuelan economy experienced a significant downturn following a failed military coup to overthrow 
Chavez and a two-month strike by PDVSA workers. Oil production dropped from close to 3 million bpd to less than 
500,000 bpd in January 2003.”(Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). 
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decreased during the decade. Hence with the global subprime financial crisis, the 
oil demand and its price crashed and as a result spare capacity in 2010 was 
estimated to be at a comfortable level of spare capacity of around 7 million to 8 
million barrels a day (Harks 2010: 254). Hence Harks also points out that this 
situation was created by external factors rather than by deliberate strategies, it is 
therefore likely that in an event of an economic upturn spare capacity may run dry 
again.  
 
National Oil Companies  
 
According to PIW’s (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly) yearly rankings 17 of the 25 
largest oil companies today are NOCs. In addition, NOCs like Statoil and 
Petrobras have become industry leaders worldwide within their specific expertise 
(Henderson 2012:45). In the past five years there have been several studies of 
NOCs. Here I would like to highlight three that have particularly influenced the 
recent debates on the topic.  
 
In 2007 the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy conducted a series of in 
depth case studies on a range of NOCs. The presentation of the case studies 
entailed the following six conclusions. Firstly, NOCs have noncommercial 
objectives that differ from IOCs objectives, for example; redistribution, foreign 
and strategic policy, energy security, wealth creation for the nation, domestic 
politics and economic development. Secondly the extent to which the 
noncommercial objectives govern the behavior of a NOC has a huge impact on its 
ability to replace and expand its oil and gas production. Thirdly, the institutional 
structure and regulatory framework can make a NOC much more effective. It 
reduces the impact of noncommercial activities upon the core business and in 
addition, multiple NOCs can improve the efficiency. Another point which the 
study revealed was the importance of international capital markets in facilitating 
corporate responsibilities. A new trend was also discovered; NOCs have long 
been excluded from downstream and marketing segments in consuming markets, 
however lately NOCs have been seeking to gain market share in these segments 
and by doing so creating opportunities for new strategic alliances between NOCs 
and IOCs. Finally, the study emphasized the growing importance of NOCs in the 
global oil market and that this should be of concern for importing countries in 
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particularly concerning insufficient reinvestment rates and responses to vertical 
integration.  
 
A second study was published by the World Bank in 2011, it focused on value 
creation among NOCs. Four particular questions were asked and answered in the 
study. Firstly, internal governance structures appeared to be more important than 
external and there is a tendency that wholly state-owned NOCs have more 
national missions to oblige to and have fewer incentives to improve efficiency. 
However, cultural differences explain why similar corporate governance 
structures may function in a dissimilar way. Secondly, the study concluded that 
large resource endowments are a disincentive to efficient production, hence that it 
is the manner in which they are exploited that matters. Thirdly, they found that 
sheltering a NOC from competition by restrictions on access helps the NOC to 
focus on developing necessary competence and economies of scale. Hence, such 
measures can have decreasing effects on value creation over time. And finally, 
they concluded that national mission objectives hamper value creation when their 
pursuit is in conflict with other value added functions (Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa 
2011).  
 
The third study was conducted by PESD and published in the book Oil and 
Governance: state-owned enterprises and the world energy supply. First of all this 
study asks why a NOC is created and maintained and what they found was; fear 
that IOCs were not delivering adequate revenues and benefits, nationalism, 
contribution to the nation’s industrial base and lastly to take over from IOCs one´s 
the risky part is over. Another research topic was what influenced the performance 
of a NOC and the study found that state goals, geology and consistency in the 
state-NOC interactions to be important indicators. 
 
The increase of NOCs coupled with the fact that almost all current reserves are 
nationalized has been argued to lead to an underinvestment in the industry.  
Several scholars argue that in many exporting countries, the relationships between 
the states as owners and NOCs are too complex and inefficient and this yields 
very low rates of investment in the oil sector. For example, revenues from the oil 
industry that could be used for reinvestments are instead used to subsidize 
domestic oil prices (Jaffe and Soligo 2010). 
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Market  
This section highlight debates regarding the changing influence of market forces. 
Four main trends are presented; demand, supply, price volatility and the global 
economic shift.  
 
Demand 
 
During the past decade many countries have increased their demand for oil, in 
particular emerging Asia and the BRIC’s (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Table 
3 shows how countries like China and India have more than doubled their 
consumption in the past fifteen years, whereas the demand of traditionally large 
consumers such as the U.S, Japan and Germany is stagnating. Apart from the 
increased demand by the BRIC
3
s there is also an increase from large suppliers 
such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore an interesting trend is that the new large 
consumer has given rise to consumer/importing NOCs.  
 
Importing NOCs seek to acquire reserves and invest in properties abroad to 
supplement inadequate domestic supplies (such as China and India) or because 
domestic supplies are largely nonexistent (as in South Korea or Japan)(Ziegler 
2008:134). Some argue that the consumer NOCs of Asia resembles the 
characteristics of the seven sisters in the middle of the past century (Harks 2010a).  
Table 3 Top 10 oil consumers 
TOP 10 consumers  1995 2000 2005 2011 
in million barrels per day  
   
  
USA 17,72 19,70 20,80 18,84 
China 3,39 4,77 6,94 9,76 
Japan 5,75 5,54 5,33 4,42 
India 1,58 2,26 2,57 3,47 
Russian Federation  3,10 2,55 2,62 2,96 
Saudi Arabia 1,30 1,58 1,97 2,86 
Brazil 1,78 2,04 2,07 2,65 
South Korea 2,02 2,26 2,31 2,40 
Germany  2,87 2,75 2,59 2,36 
Canada 1,76 1,92 2,23 2,29 
Source: BP statistical review 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 With the exception of Russia 
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Supply 
 
The number of suppliers and their size has been fairly stable over the past decade. 
Table 4 is a compilation of data gathered from BP’s statistical reviews in the 
period between 1995 and 2011; it shows the top ten countries in terms of reserves 
and production. There are no major changes since 1995.  
Table 4 Top 10 oil producers and proven reserves by country 
Top 10 producers  1995 2000 2005 2011 
in million barrels per day  
   
  
Saudi Arabia 9,09 9,44 11,03 11,16 
Russian Federation  6,24 6,47 9,44 10,28 
USA 8,32 7,73 6,90 7,84 
Iran  3,74 3,85 4,18 4,32 
China  2,99 3,26 3,64 4,09 
Canada  2,40 2,72 3,04 3,52 
United Arab Emirates 2,40 2,62 2,98 3,32 
Mexico  3,05 3,46 3,77 2,94 
Kuwait 2,13 2,24 2,65 2,87 
Iraq 0,53 2,61 1,83 2,80 
Top 10 Proven reserves         
 in billion barrels  1995 2000 2005 2011 
Venezuela  66,3 76,8 80,0 296,5 
Saudi Arabia 261,5 262,8 264,2 265,4 
Canada 48,4 181,5 180,5 175,2 
Iran  93,7 99,5 137,5 151,2 
Iraq  100,0 112,5 115,0 143,1 
Kuwait 96,5 96,5 101,5 101,5 
United Arab Emirates 98,1 97,8 97,8 97,8 
Russian Federation  n/a 68,5 80,2 88,2 
Libya  29,5 36,0 41,5 47,1 
Nigeria 20,8 29,0 36,2 37,2 
Source: BP statistical review 
Hence, it is important to note also what we don’t know because the reserves 
presented in table 4 are simply estimations and projections. Hubbert developed his 
theory of peak oil already in the 1950s and still today it is a controversial topic 
when discussing future supply. The term peak oil refers to the point of maximum 
global production, however the debate of whether this point is reached, ever will 
be reached or already has past is continuous. A popular modification of the model 
is to call it peak cheap oil, meaning that oil with relatively cheap production costs 
will no longer be found. So there is no lack of resources as such but rather that the 
new discoveries will be found in very tricky geology and in unconventional 
sources (Noreng 2012:121).  
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Investments, Volatile price and the financial crisis 
 
There are a few interrelated obstacles to efficiency that has been difficult for the 
entire industry during the past decade, namely lack of investments, volatility in 
the oil price and the financial crisis. The financial crisis thought to have affected 
the rate of investment negatively both by lowering the oil price and secondly by 
general precaution towards investments and credit constraints (Fattouh and Van 
der Linde 2011:103,127). This recent volatility in prices has had a negative impact 
on investments  and in addition it triggers opportunistic behavior on the part of 
whoever has the temporary advantage (Bressand 2010).  
 
The price of oil saw between 2002 to the financial crisis the longest sustained 
increase. However in the years following the crisis we have seen an intensified 
price volatility (Harks 2010a). The increased and volatility may be an effect of 
several causes, among those proposed are financial speculation (Yergin 2011), 
increase in demand (Harbo 2008:42) low reinvestment rates of host governments 
and NOCs (Radetzki 2012) and transparency. Most likely there is a combination 
of all these factors.  However, the fluctuations, at least may indicate that today we 
do not have any cartels controlling the price on neither side of the equation, at 
least non effective such.  
 
However, the lack of investments and specialization among NOCs and the lack of 
resources among IOCs appears to have triggered new dynamics in the industry.  
NOCs are still dependent on investments or technologies/expertise from abroad 
forcing entry barriers to be lowered. Previous frontiers have largely been about 
exploration and development in new geographies, and the private operating 
companies, of all sizes have become skillful in managing risks. The IEF claim that 
IOCs are the preferred partners for long-term ventures,  in addition to technology 
and finance, IOCs bring a package of operational expertise and project 
management capabilities as well as market knowledge and access (2012:7). In 
addition, its suggested that service companies are taking over the many tasks from 
IOCs (IEF 2012:7). There has been an increase in strategic alliances both between 
NOCs and between NOCs and IOCs (Xu 2007). "This period (2000s) witnessed 
the renegotiation of contract terms and conditions for many projects which 
signaled a shift in the balance of the relationship between NOCs and IOCs. 
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Contracts between NOCs and services companies grew in size and importance 
over the same period" (IEF 2012:4). 
 
Due to the issues with transparency, a volatile price and the creation of new 
alliances, an emerging question is for how long the dollar will be seen as the 
favorable currency to make transactions (Noreng 2011). The financial crisis did 
not only bring a fall and volatility to the oil price, it also brought a shift of power 
in the international economy from the U.S. to China which may in the future lead 
to other changes for the price of oil. Noreng elaborates on the topic; China is 
becoming the most important trading partner of many oil-exporting countries and 
this together with the rising convertibility of the Yuan may well lead the way for 
oil-pricing in the Chinese currency in the future (Noreng 2012:22).  
 
Institutions 
 
Previously the dialogue between consuming and producing states and companies 
has been centered between IEA and OPEC. However, the new millennium has 
seen the rise of the new consumers and producers. On the demand side in 
particular emerging economies such as the BRICs and on the supply side new 
field developments in Africa and Caspian Basin. This means that the emerging 
key players are not in the old debate and thereby they often stand outside the 
institutional network. Furthermore these new players conceive a wide range of 
different interests, aspirations and perceptions of the energy challenges (Fattouh 
and van der Linde 2011). The IEA has in later years been reaching out for a 
dialogue with new consumers such as China and India, hence interest of 
membership has been fairly low both from the newcomers and existing members 
(Kohl 2010).  
 
For most commodities, there is some form of regime governing the market, most 
commonly the WTO. However, for the oil market there is no such overarching 
regime or a clear forum for discussion and resolving disputes. Oil governance is 
rather a highly complex network of institutions and organizations covering 
different parts of oil governance. The most known are WPC and IEF, however 
none of these have managed to gather all parties or important issues to the table.   
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One issue that have received a lot of attention lately and that exemplifies different 
aspects and changes in the organizational influence on governance is efforts to 
create an institutional and regulatory framework to enhance transparency.  In 
order for actors to make rational actions and for the market exchange to work as 
an efficient price-setter, actors need adequate and equal information. As touched 
upon in the sections above, there are uncertainties for example the amount of 
reserves available. Furthermore, several oil companies received criticism for lack 
of transparency in a variety of data, such as production levels and financial 
performance  
 
Voluntary cooperation  
 
The volatility of oil prices in the 1990s brought a consensus for more cooperation 
for the benefit of consumers and producers alike. A platform for this process was 
created by the launch of the IEF in 1991, initiated by OPEC and IEA. 
 
It became more and more apparent that the unavailability and unreliability of data 
is a major obstacle to a stable price (Goldthau 2012:74). Concerns for the lack of 
transparency in the market were raised several times during the late 1990s and on 
the 7
th
 ministers meeting of the IEF in Kiyadh in 2000 the development of a Joint 
Oil Data Exercise was initiated in collaboration with six organizations (APEC 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), Eurostat, IEA, OLADE (Organización 
Latinoamericana de Energia), OPEC and UNSD(United Nations Statistics 
Division)). In November 2005, the initiative was established as a permanent 
mechanism under the name JODI and the database was made public online.  The 
IEF secretariat has promoted and supported the JODI as representing the single 
most important collaborative effort to address the issue of market data 
transparency (Van der Linde och Luciani 2012). It is a remarkable step forward as 
the initiative covers 90 percent world supply and demand (Harks 2010: 260). 
Furthermore, the IEF wishes for the initiative to be further expanded to include 
investments to further increase transparency in the market (JODI 2013).  
 
Since JODIs public launch in 2005 data is available on their website and reporting 
assessments are published yearly, a compilation of those reports is available in 
Appendix 1. As the tables in Appendix 1 show there is neither a great increase nor 
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decrease in the data available and reported. Perhaps what is more worrying is the 
fact that even though reporting is becoming more institutionalized and 
systematized this is no guarantee for accuracy. With the exception of the IEA 
countries
4
 all other data are based on estimations, which in most cases are 
educated guesses by bankers, industry traders, or journalists. The lack of 
transparency in most cases is a result of two realities. Firstly, it is a result of 
confidentiality of such data in certain countries and secondly there are cases 
where neither companies nor the states themselves actually have any data (Harks 
2010:249).  
 
The JODI is by many seen as a step in the right direction to enhance transparency. 
However, the initiative is reliant on voluntary contributions and operates without 
sharp teeth. The driving force and motivator to submit data is a common need for 
an efficient market. Hence, as Florini and Saleem points out; not all states may 
find this as a motivator, rather in the short-term some may be beneficiaries of a 
less transparent market ( 2011:146). There are three main motivations and desired 
governance outcomes that drive disclosure initiatives in the energy sector: 
(1)making markets work more efficiently, (2) inducing corporations to internalize 
negative externalities and (3) improving democratic processes for better energy 
governance outcomes (Florini och Saleem 2011:146). 
 
EITI 
Another initiative is EITI, which sheds light on another important aspect of 
transparency, namely inter-payments between companies and governments. The 
initiative was primarily a reaction to the 1999 Global Witness Report Crude 
Awakening Angola and Human Rights Watch report The price of oil in Nigeria. 
Global Witness and Transparency International UK formed an alliance and in 
2002 they created the campaign PWYP (Publish What You Pay). Later in the 
same year, on the initiative of Tony Blair at the sustainable development summit 
in Johannesburg the launch of EITI was announced (Eigen 2007:333-34). In 2003, 
Azerbaijan and Nigeria were the first countries to commit to the initiative, in the 
same year the World Bank also endorsed the EITI. Norway committed as the first 
developed country to the initiative in 2007. An overview of compliance is 
available in Appendix 2.  
                                                 
4IEA members have signed a legally binding international agreement making data submission compulsory. 
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In 2008 the World Bank announced EITI ++ which aims to attain transparency in 
the entire value chain rather than just revenue inflows (Benner and Soares de 
Oliviera 2010:297). The EITI process has also inspired and collaborated with 
other initiatives, such as Open Society Institute through the Revenue Watch 
Institute and the International Monetary Fund has published a guide on resource 
revenue transparency. Furthermore in 2004 the European Parliament amended a 
directive to promote disclosures (Benner and Soares de Oliviera 2010:297).  
 
Regulatory measures 
  
In addition to voluntary cooperation there are also regulatory measures taken. A 
recent example is the EU who mandated publicly listed European companies to 
stricter disclosure of payments for oil, gas and mining projects in April 2013. 
Prior to that, in 2010 the U.S. amended the Dodd-Frank Act, which several IOCs 
have taken action against. IOCs are fighting against stricter requirements  by 
backing the American Petroleum Institute (API) in its law suit against SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) in order to stop (Kaufmann 2013). Hence, 
there have also been calls for harder legislative measures such as new accounting 
standards for extractive industries as proposed by the European Parliament in 
2007 as well as in the U.S there are ongoing discussions in the U.S. Congress on 
the Extractive Industries (Benner and Soares de Oliviera 2010:297).  
 
As earlier mentioned many of the major players are state-owned companies that 
are not obliged to reporting standards of stock-listed companies and this is argued 
to add to the dilemma of increasing transparency (Goldthau 2012:74). On that 
note, we have seen several NOCs become stock listed; they have become what the 
World Bank calls Partial NOCs. Partial NOCs have the state as a majority 
shareholder but due to an external minority stake they need to increase reporting 
standards. However it is not only reporting standards that are the cause of loose 
reporting, researchers also point to the fact that in many cases the size of for 
example subsidies is unknown even to the companies and the government 
themselves (Benner and Soares de Oliviera 2010:297). The business model and 
performance of Statoil and Petrobras, appears to be a appealing to other NOCs, 
and in the past decade we have seen giants such as Rosneft and Petrochina 
becoming stock listed.  
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Trends and findings 
This section will translate what we have learnt about the oil market in the 21
st
 
century into market conditions. The market conditions used are drawn from 
classical economics and the perfect market hypothesis. The hypothesis states that 
a commodity is in perfect competition of free trade if the following five 
characteristics prevail (Aumann, 1966 et.al):  (1) that the commodity is a 
homogenous good, (2) that there exists multiple actors on both demand and 
supply side and thereby avoiding monopolies or oligopolies, (3) that all 
participants have the same information, (4) that entry barriers are low and (5) that 
all participants are price takers. Drawing from the literature review I expect that I 
will not find perfect competition in neither of the periods. However, the ambition 
is to extract changes, some indicators may have decreased whereas others have 
increased. This information will be very helpful in chapter 4 and 5 where I try to 
answer the questions of why and how.  
Market mechanisms  
Below the four indicators; multiple actors, information, entry barriers and price 
setting are analysed in order to visualize changes and trends.  
 
Multiple actors  
 
This indicator reveals an increase in demand side actors and a stagnant amount of 
supply side actors.  There are no traits of monopoly, monopolies or oligopolies on 
either side of the equilibrium equation.  
 
The most significant change during this period is the increase in demand; the 
largest consumers such as the U.S and Japan are stagnating, whereas new large 
consumers are emerging, in particular the BRIC countries. Hence, we can also 
read from table 3.1 that large producers have also increased their domestic 
demand. Most likely, this is an effect of subsidizing domestic oil consumption for 
a very long time, as in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. In the BRIC countries, on the 
other hand, the increase of demand is more related to economic growth.  An 
additional angle to this change is that the new major consumers are all represented 
by NOCs, so in a sense the last decade have seen a rise of NOCs on the demand 
side.  
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There has been no major change on the supply side, reserves are spread across the 
globe creating a vast amount of suppliers and about 90% of reserves are 
nationalized. Even though resources are scattered across the globe there are a few 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Iran that hold an immense amount 
of reserves, see table 4.  Those reserves that are not nationalized are likely to be 
found in a difficult geology such as ultra-deep seas and the Arctic.  
 
Transparency  
 
In terms of transparency, we have two opposing trends; on the one hand consumer 
NOCs who lack comprehensive reporting standards (at least to the public) are 
increasing their market share and thereby decrease transparency to the rest of the 
market. On the other hand, we have seen both voluntary and regulatory 
interventions to correct for the lack of transparency. Perhaps not optimal yet, but 
an institutional framework for dealing with the issues is taking shape, represented 
by initiatives such as JODI and EITI.  
 
Transparency and equal information of market actors and stakeholders is at the 
core of the free market. It is evident that the oil market is still struggling to 
achieve high reporting standards. Even though some practices are expected to 
improve, there are some problems related to transparency that appears to be 
inherent to the oil industry, such as how much oil is left in the ground and 
economic rents.  
 
Entry barriers  
 
A market can have many different types of entry barriers, the most significant 
identified in the previous chapters for the current decade is government policy and 
specialization. Government policy refers to the nationalization of resources and 
the market dominance of NOCs in the domestic market created by protective 
policies. The second entry barrier is specialization, both in terms of technology 
and investments required. The entry barriers for NOCs and IOCs look slightly 
different. However both barriers discussed here applies to both as a result of many 
NOCs expanding on the world oil market.  
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Common for both IOCs and NOCs are that a main barrier is specialization and 
investments required. The previously mentioned report by Ernst & Young 
proposed that the major opportunities in the industry in 2011 belonged to frontier 
acreage, unconventional sources and difficult geology. These opportunities do not 
only require investments but also they require specialization. "A combination of 
high oil prices and limited access to reserves has pushed many oil companies in 
non-OPEC countries to explore new frontiers"(Fattouh and van der Linde 2011). 
New frontiers are found in ultra-deep waters along the Brazilian coast, under the 
melting ice of the Arctic and in unconventional sources. According to the latest 
EIA International Energy Outlook; "global production of unconventional liquids 
will increase from 3.4 mb/d in 2007 to 12.9 mb/d in 2035, accounting for 12 
percent of the world’s total liquids supply in 2035".  All in all the two major 
obstacles for IOCs and NOCs alike are specialization and government regulation.  
 
As compared to ten or twenty years ago, both of these barriers have lowered for 
NOCs as they have increasingly received financial collaboration from their 
governments which leads to increased specialization and regulatory advantages. 
Whereas for IOCs the entry barriers have risen rather than lowered, due 
nationalized resources and the credit crunch in the aftermath of the crisis.  
 
Price-takers 
 
If all participants to a market are price takers then no single actor should be able 
to affect the price significantly, all actors should be price takers not price makers. 
The analyses in the chapters above indicate that the market exchange is still the 
preferred price setter in the first decade of the new millennium.  
 
The emerging economies, in particular the BRIC countries are argued to be of 
more importance in the brewing paradigm. They are likely to become the new 
rule-makers in terms of supply, access and sustainability. This does not 
necessarily mean that the OECD countries will be excluded from the oil market, 
rather that they now will become rule-takers rather than rule-makers (Goldthau 
2012). Some scholars predict that with the power shift in international economics 
from the U.S. to China we will also lead to a change in the chosen currency of 
pricing oil. Either by an absolute change in currency or through a basket of 
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currencies (Noreng 2012:121). As for now it appears as if the market exchange is 
still the preferred price-setter. Hence, we may see an increase in bilateral purchase 
agreements, but for now we have a global oil market where the market exchange 
is a common price setter.  Furthermore strategic reserves and spare capacity create 
additional protection against potential attempts to influence the price.   
 
All in all research cannot prove any sign of cartel building, furthermore as 
demand has increased and spare capacity might be in decline, rather some scholars 
point to the fact that there is an increased likelihood of bilateral agreements and a 
change of currency. In other words, the past decade show a higher likelihood of 
consumer-producer agreements rather than producer-producer cartels; hence as of 
today all actors are price takers just as in the 1990s.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the findings in this chapter and answers the question of how 
the market conditions have changed.  
 
Table 5 Market mechanisms 
Market mechanism  Comment  
Actors  Increase of demand side actors whereas supply remains stable  
Transparency  Increased cooperation and regulatory measures for stock listed 
companies on one hand. Increase of state-owned companies that 
lack reporting standards on the other. 
Entry barriers Regulation by host governments and specialization  
Price-setting Free market exchange remains as price setter 
 
Case Selection 
From this chapter we have learnt about major changes of the oil market in the 21
st
 
century. In order to get a deeper understanding of why these changes have 
occurred as well as identify consequences of the changes the next two chapters are 
based on six NOC cases. The selection of NOCs is based on choosing actors that 
appear to play a major role and appear to be driving the changes in the oil market 
today.  Table 6 is a compilation of data drawn from PIWs yearly rankings and 
shows the top 15 companies by output and reserves in 2001, 2004 and 2011.   
According to the findings above as well as data presented in chapters one and 
three, I have selected six companies to look further into; CNPC (China National 
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Petroleum Corporation), Saudi Aramco, PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela S.A), 
Rosneft, ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) and Petrobras.  These were 
selected based on their significance in the current oil market as well as being 
identified as drivers of change. In the history of the oil market we identified some 
key drivers of change for each paradigm, they do not necessarily have to be the 
largest company, hence they are/were either new to the market or had such great 
market share that their strategies and motives and perceptions of oil as a good had 
consequences for the entire industry.  
Table 6 Top 15 companies by oil output and reserves 
Oil output  2001   2004   2011   
In million barrels per day Rank  Volume  Rank Volume  Rank  Volume  
Saudi Aramco 1 8,30 1 9,83 1 10,01 
NIOC 2 3,77 2 4,08 2 4,29 
PDVSA 4 3,00 4 2,60 3 2,97 
Pemex 3 3,56 3 3,75 4 2,90 
CNPC 8 2,09 9 2,12 5 2,84 
KPC 11 1,76 7 2,42 6 2,56 
ExxonMobil 5 2,54 5 2,57 7 2,42 
INOC† 6 2,41 10 2,03 8 2,40 
BP 10 1,93 6 2,53 9 2,37 
Rosneft 40 0,30 36 0,43 10 2,32 
Petrobras 14 1,38 16 1,65 11 2,15 
Lukoil 17 1,20 12 1,74 12 1,94 
Chevron 9 1,96 11 1,74 13 1,92 
Royal Dutch Shell 7 2,22 8 2,33 14 1,71 
ADNOC 16 1,28 18 1,36 15 1,54 
Oil reserves 2001   2004   2011   
In billion barrels  Rank Volume  Rank  Volume  Rank  Volume  
PDVSA 5 77,78 5 77,14 1 296,50 
Saudi Aramco 1 261,80 1 262,70 2 264,50 
NIOC 4 89,70 2 132,50 3 151,82 
INOC† 2 112,50 3 115,00 4 143,10 
KPC 3 96,50 4 89,40 5 101,55 
ADNOC 6 53,79 6 52,62 6 52,81 
Libya NOC 8 23,60 7 28,78 7 32,96 
CNPC 15 10,96 14 11,02 8 25,68 
NNPC 12 14,40 8 21,18 9 22,30 
Rosneft 25 6,39 26 4,75 10 18,11 
Lukoil 9 17,36 9 15,97 11 13,32 
ExxonMobil 14 12,31 13 11,65 12 11,67 
Pemex 7 43,21 10 14,80 13 11,39 
Sontrach 17 8,74 15 10,99 14 11,30 
Petrobras 20 7,75 17 9,95 15 10,77 
Source: PIW rankings 2001, 2004 and 2011 
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4. Goods and strategies 
 
This chapter investigates what is driving the selected NOCs and how their 
motives, strategies and obligations have changed since the mid 1990’s. The 
chapter analyzes the six cases selected in the previous chapter; CNPC, Saudi 
Aramco, PDVSA, Rosneft, Petrobras and ONGC. The analysis is based on three 
dimensions; corporate governance, domestic market structure and non-
commercial activities. Corporate governance relates to whether the companies are 
mainly influenced by state or corporate values and strategies. The domestic 
market structure relates to whether NOCs enjoy monopoly or if they are part of a 
competitive market. Lastly non-commercial activities relates to the amount of 
socioeconomic responsibilities and obligations that the NOCs have. Furthermore, 
in the beginning of each NOC presentation there is a brief historical overview. At 
the end of the chapter there is a summary of findings and a comparison among the 
NOCs on the different dimensions.   
China National Petroleum Corporation  
During WWII both production and consumption of oil gained importance in 
China and militarized efforts to find oil started, by early 1970 China had become a 
net exporter. However, the industry was working inefficiently and by 1988 the 
entire petroleum industry was losing money. The central government abolished 
the MPI (Ministry of Petroleum Industry) and assigned its assets and 
responsibilities to CNPC. Responsibilities included setting and maintaining 
standards and regulation for the petroleum industry, as well as coordination with 
the state and Sinopec (Jiang 2012).  
 
China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and it marked a major shift for the 
domestic industry.  The Chinese oil consumption doubled in the past decade, from 
4.5 million barrels per day (mb/d) in beginning of 2000s to near 9 mb/d
5
 in the 
end of the 2000s. Even though the future is always uncertain, most predictions 
indicate that consumption will double again by 2030.  
                                                 
5 In order to gain perspective, global consumption is roughly 90 mb/d.  
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Corporate Governance 
In the period between 1988 and 1998 CNPC was governed by the state and top 
management was appointed by the government (Jiang 2012). Since 1998 the 
governance issue has become more blurred, researchers and analysts have 
difficulties distinguishing pure commercially driven strategies from those imposed 
by the state. Particularly debated is the so called ‘going abroad strategy’ which by 
some is claimed to be a mercantilist approach to securing resources and  by others 
to be a market driven commercial expansionary strategy (Jian 2011:3). The truth 
may lie somewhere in between, CNPC and the Chinese state do have a common 
task; to supply China’s growing demand for oil.  
 
The going abroad strategy of the Chinese government has been through five 
distinct phases.  In Phase 3 (1993-1998), CNPC was chosen as one of the first 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) s to make investments abroad. In Phase 5, which 
started in 2002 (and is still ongoing), the Chinese state has entered a role of 
encouraging overseas investments and facilitation of such strategies, by for 
example backing favorable loans (Bellona and Spigarelli 2007). Therefore, one 
could say that the relationship between company and government rather  is one of 
symbiosis than control (Ziegler 2008:162). Many scholars agree to the fact that it 
is both commercial objectives and government strategies that drive this form of 
energy diplomacy, hence some argue that NOCs are in the driver seat (Goldthau 
2010) (Jian 2011:3). Other researchers emphasize that Chinese NOCs are still tied 
to the Chinese culture and political system and that a transition towards more 
internationalization and autonomy will take decades (Xu 2007:25).  
 
All in all, CNPC is not transparent enough for outsiders to fully grasp the 
corporate governance structure; hence what we can say is that there are mutual 
benefits for cooperation between CNPC and the state. There is no doubt that there 
is a growing demand for oil in China and that this in conjunction with China 
becoming a net importer of oil has triggered Chinese companies to venture abroad 
in order to supply the domestic market. At the same the global financial crisis 
gave China new opportunities to utilize its large foreign exchange reserves and 
expand its investments in the global market (Jian 2011). However an important 
step towards more openness and transparency has been the listing of PetroChina 
on the stock exchange. PetroChina is the holding company for CNPCs most 
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attractive and financially viable core assets. PetroChina has been an important 
source of raising revenues and for engagement in the overseas market. CPNC 
controls 86 percent of PetroChinas stock, in other words it has ultimate control 
(ibid).  
Domestic monopoly 
In 1998, the government ordered sweeping reforms that restructured the entire 
Chinese oil industry. The impetus for change was the government’s desire to 
create a Chinese petroleum industry that would be competitive with IOCs in the 
global market. Reforms concentrated on 3 main actions; recentralizing the oil 
industry, swapping assets between CNPC and Sinopec in order to create two fully 
vertically integrated companies and the creation of PetroChina as a holding 
company of the most valuable assets(Jiang 2012).  
 
Today there are five major oil companies in China; CNPC, CNOOC (China 
National Offshore Oil, Sinopec, Sinopec star petroleum and Sinochem, together 
they account for 90 percent of Chinas oil and gas production, all of these 
companies can historically be traced back to the ministries. Onshore oil 
production has been and still remains largely limited to Chinese NOCs, offshore 
and unconventional production is open for IOCs. IOCs are invited to PSC 
(Production Sharing Contracts) on the condition that Chinese NOCs holds a 
majority stake. As these market segments are increasing Chinese NOCs are 
dependent on IOCs for expertise and technology (EIA, 2013). However, the 
midstream and downstream markets can almost be seen as a duopoly between 
Sinopec and CNPC (Sinopec in the South east and CNPC in the North West) 
(Jiang 2012). 
State responsibilities – non-commercial activities 
Even though it appears as if CNPCs non-commercial burden has decreased since 
it was separated from the ministry, several obligations still exist. Firstly, CNPC is 
a major employer, with over 1, 5 million employees it beats any other NOC with a 
million (PIW, 2011). Another costly activity is the subsidization of domestic 
consumption, hence the exact size of these are not known (Jiang 2012). The 
Chinese government has adjusted the price slowly, a consequence of being reliant 
on imports, big differences does still occur. For example when international oil 
prices picked up after the crisis in 2010 and 2011, the NDRC (National 
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Development and Reform Commission),price setting authority, did not increase 
downstream fuel prices at the same rate, forcing NOCs to incur profit losses and 
negative margins in the downstream segment. In 2012 the NDRC has 
administered several increases in the price to try to match international prices 
more closely (EIA 2013).  In a global setting, China is ranked fifth in terms of 
fossil fuel subsidization and is one of the countries that are still subsidizing coal. 
Of China’s 31,05 billion in fossil fuel subsidies in 2011, oil receives the most with 
59 %, then electricity with 36 % and coal at 4%.  
 
CNPC is different from other NOCs in that their operations accounts for a very 
little part of the country´s GDP (only 0,4 %). So the government does not need it 
as a fundraising vehicle, rather it is the government that offer assistance in 
investments abroad (Beeson, Soko, and Yong 2011). 
 
Saudi Aramco 
For the past decade Saudi Aramco has been ranked as the largest oil company in 
the world by Petroleum Intelligence Weekly’s yearly ranking. Apart from having 
some of the largest oil reserves on the planet, Saudi Aramco is famous for its 
particular way of combining the Saudi culture with the inherited multinational 
governance structure from the west. The success of the 1973 oil embargo hastened 
nationalizations in many countries and paved the way for Saudi Arabia to press its 
plans to obtain ownership of Aramco. The Kingdom began by taking a minority 
stake in Aramco´s ownership, which was followed by a gradual increase as well 
as training and placement of Saudi nationals into key management positions. The 
nationalization was different in Saudi Arabia compared to other countries. For 
example there was little public mobilization and most elites believed that 
continued collaboration with U.S majors would be more lucrative to the kingdom 
than outright nationalization. Therefore when compared to other NOC´s in the 
region, nationalization had little impact on the organizational structure and 
operations (Stevens 2012). 
 
On September 5
th
 1980 the Government of Saudi Arabia announced its complete 
purchase of Aramco´s assets, meaning that the Kingdom gained control over the 
company and thereby 90 percent of the Kingdom´s production. In the years 
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following the complete purchase, Saudi Arabia controlled the company de facto 
but Americans still administered Aramco on a daily basis under the orders of 
Saudi leadership. Ironically, the final paperwork for full nationalization was not 
signed until 1990, two years after the reorganization of Saudi Arabia´s oil industry 
into a single state monopoly, Saudi Aramco (Jaffe and Elass 2007).  
Corporate Governance 
Saudi Aramco´s American roots can still be seen in the structure of the 
management and exemplified by its committee format and voting boards of 
directors and the working language is still English. However, the inherited closed 
Saudi culture is argued to have become a vital part of the company and a reason 
for the nontransparent behavior. Furthermore King Abdullah has final decision-
making power on all matters involving oil production, investments, external 
policies and domestic energy pricing and subsidies( Jaffe and Elass 2007). Due to 
the company’s importance for the Kingdom, major decisions tend to be taken by 
consensus between the king, senior members of the Al-Saud family and energy 
experts. The ruling family has ultimate control of the oil industry, but as a 
practical matter it delegates authority to public administration. A key institution is 
the SPC (Supreme Petroleum Council). The SPC acts as a conduit between the 
king and his small group of advisors who pass onto the ministry questions and 
directions (Stevens 2012). However, there are situations in which the Kingdom 
have used the company as a foreign policy tool, as for example during the Gulf 
war in the 1990s when Saudi Aramco replaced the production of Kuwait and Iraqi 
oil companies after being allied with the international coalition. 
 
Operational expenses and investments are financed out of retained earnings, but 
additional funds for major projects need to be allocated through the national 
budget via the Ministry of Finance (Jaffe and Elass 2007). The last decade have 
seen investments in human capital, in particular through its Exploration and 
Petroleum Engineering Center (Saudi Aramco, 2012).Furthermore investments 
have been diverted towards downstream rather than upstream activities both at 
home and abroad (Stevens 2012). The financial structure is different from many 
other NOCs, Saudi Aramco is allowed to keep revenue from crude and product 
sales and then pays royalties and dividends equal to 93 percent of its profits (ibid).  
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Domestic monopoly 
Ranks as the largest oil company in the world, and it has done so since 1993 when 
the Saudi government authorized that Saudi Aramco should absorb all 
downstream functions in the kingdom (Sinclair 2008). Saudi Aramco dominates 
all segments of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia. It produces and sells 95 % of the 
oil produced in the kingdom. In addition, the company has the sole concession 
right of the kingdoms reserves. However the company has the right to subcontract 
any domestic or international company for service contracts. Insofar international 
companies have only been hired for operations in the Neutral Zone bordering 
Kuwait and for natural gas development (Revenue Watch 2013a).  
State responsibilities – non commercial activities 
Saudi Aramco’s mission statement declares investment in Saudi nationals to be “a 
national obligation and a strategic goal” (Jaffe and Elass 2007:68).  It is a large 
national sponsor of technical education and training. In its 2005 annual report, the 
company pays attention to its involvement in building and maintaining 
government schools since 1953. Since 1994, 4 800 have completed university 
degrees at the company´s expense (ibid). Saudi Aramco is the core of the 
kingdoms economy, the oil and gas sector accounts for 90% of government 
income and 88 % of exports (Revenue Watch 2013a). In addition Saudi Aramco is 
a major employer in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Another aspect is its subsidization activities of domestic supplies. “It sells oil to 
domestic refineries at a steep discount, effectively subsidizing national energy 
prices and adheres to employment quotas favoring Saudi citizens” (Revenue 
Watch 2013a). The exact size of these is difficult to calculate due to lacking data 
and Saudi Aramco has been criticized by several organizations such as Revenue 
Watch for its poor reporting standards. For example annual reports do not include 
information in royalties, dividends or other payments to the state. Saudi Arabia is 
the second largest country in the world by subsidizing end-use fossil-fuel prices, 
providing 76 % of it’s almost $ 61 billion in fossil fuel consumption subsidizes to 
oil and 24 percent to electricity. In 2011 the average subsidization rate was 79,5%, 
subsidy per person was $2291,1 and total subsidy as share of GDP is 10,6% (IEA 
2012).  
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Rosneft 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in September 1991 Rosneftgas 
Corporation, an association of Russian oil enterprises was formed to replace the 
U.S.S.R Ministry of Oil industry. A year later massive privatization reforms were 
passed and three privatized companies were created; LUKOIL, Surneftegas and 
Yukos. The remainders of the Russian oil industry formed a state entity called 
Rosneft (Poussenkova, 2007). 
Corporate Governance 
When created Rosneft was appointed to carry out trust management in 259 out of 
the 301 oil enterprises operating in Russia at that time. Furthermore, Rosneft was 
appointed several regulatory and policy related functions such as ensuring stable 
deliveries of oil, gas and petroleum products, represent interests on boards, 
coordinate state investments in the oil industry, promote R&D and facilitate 
investments (Poussenkova, 2007).  
 
Liberalization continued throughout the mid 1990s, even though Rosneft 
remained many of its assets and subsidiaries were lost. In April 1995 Rosneft was 
transformed into an open Joint Stock Company. At the same time assets were 
further diminished and it’s regulatory and policy obligations were decreased (IEA, 
2007). Hence Rosneft still had state obligations such as trust management, 
sponsorship of R&D efforts and Representation of state interests in PSCs (ibid). 
The diminishing structure of Rosneft is said to have reached its peak during the 
1998 financial crisis when many core assets were lost.  
 
However, the new millennium was a turning point for the company, Putin came to 
power and he had different plans for the company then his predecessors. In 2000 
Rosneft got permission from the RF Anti monopoly ministry to increase its stake 
in subsidiaries to 75% and began to buy their shares through affiliated companies.  
The beginning of the 2000s saw an expansionary strategy from Rosneft.  In 
October 2006, Rosneft completed consolidation of its subsidiaries (ibid).  
 
Rosneft’s IPO was launched in the summer of 2006, and the company sold 14,8 
per cent of its total equity for $10.4 billion, implying a value for the whole 
company of just under $80 billion, (BP 1,2%, Petronas 1% and CNPC 0,5%) 
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(Henderson 2012). Since then it is however once again more difficult to 
distinguish commercial and state initiatives and strategies. An important change 
occurred in March 2011 when Russia’s President Dimitry Medvedev announced 
that there would no longer be government representatives on the boards of 
companies over which they had any regulatory influence (ibid). 
 
When elaborating on the future of Rosneft, Henderson points out two major 
challenges for the company ahead. First, many of its fields are in decline and 
second the pressure from the majority owner (the Russian government) to serve as 
a major component of Russia’s overall economic strategy (2012). Rosneft has 
articulated that its overall goal is now to reach the status of super-NOC. And the 
communicated strategy to get there is by international expansion, technical 
expertise and diversification.  This combination of objectives and its status as a 
partially privatized, places the company in a peer group defined by the World 
Bank as Partial NOCs (Stevens, 2011).  
Domestic monopoly 
Rosneft is today the biggest oil company in Russia, hence it does not have a 
monopoly position, there are several large market players such as Lukoil and 
TNK-BP. Theoretically foreign companies are welcomed to invest and operate 
and there has been great interest in particular due to new geologies such as the 
Arctic and Siberia. Hence, foreign companies have found it difficult to enter the 
market and make agreements. If  IOCs are to operate in Russia it will be in 
partnership with a Russian giant, most likely Rosneft or Lukoil (EIA 2012).   
State responsibilities – non commercial activities 
Russia does not subsidize oil, even though Russia is third largest country in 
subsidization of fossil fuel consumption.  Of the $ 40 billion spent yearly on 
subsidization,  54 percent is spent on natural gas and 46 percent on electricity 
(IEA 2012). Hence for Rosneft non-commercial responsibilities are more related 
to the fact that the company is viewed as a part of a broader strategy for economic 
growth in Russia and to carry out state representation in energy related issues. 
Petroleos de Venezuela S.A  
Venezuela nationalized its oil industry in 1975 and created a national oil 
company; PDVSA. Since its creation the relationship between the state and the 
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company has been through several phases. During the late seventies and early 
eighties the company was tightly bound to the needs and wants of the government. 
President Perez envisioned the oil industry to be a means to develop the 
Venezuelan economy (Yergin 2011:111). Hence in the late eighties and early 
nineties PDVSA encountered an era of more independent strategic planning and 
autonomous corporate governance. This relationship shifted yet again by the new 
millennium when Hugo Chavez took over as president, he reinforced the state 
control of the company and the industry.  
Corporate Governance 
When Chavez gained presidential power in December 1998, it marked the 
beginning of a new era for PDVSA. Luis Giusti, the CEO at the time, resigned 
even before Chavez could fire him. Chavez had earlier expressed his thoughts 
about Giusti; the devil who had sold the Venezuelan soul to the imperialists 
(Yergin 2011:120). Chavez issued several policy changes both regarding the 
internal structure of the company as well as standpoints on more restrictive 
production quotas in the OPEC cooperation. Chavez rhetoric clearly stated that 
PDVSA now was a tool of the government with remarks like: “PDVSA workers 
are with this revolution, and those who aren’t should go somewhere else, go to 
Miami” (BBC, 2006).  
 
The minister of energy and mines is also the CEO and Chairman of the Board of 
Directors (BoD) of PDVSA. Of the 10 members of the BoD, two are independent 
directors. BoD members are appointed by the President of Venezuela for a period 
of two years; they can be removed at any time and can be reappointed indefinitely 
by the president. Furthermore the ministry establishes policies on production, 
operation and expenditures whereas the BoD is responsible for implementing the 
policies (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011).  
Domestic monopoly 
In 1975, the Organic law Reserving to the State the Industry and Commerce of 
Hydro Carbons was enacted, allowing the government to take full control of the 
oil industry. Since then PDVSA has been responsible for the development of 
Venezuela’s hydrocarbon industry, as well as Venezuela’s petrochemical sector 
and coal resources since 1978 and 1985 respectively. 
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In the middle of the 1990s Luis Gusti launched La Apertura (the opening, or 
reopening) which invited IOCs to return in order to attract investments and 
ultimately increase production (Yergin 2011:116). However, since Chavez came 
to power cooperation with foreign companies have been more restrictive. 
According to Venezuelan law PDVSA is today required by law to have a 
minimum 60 percent interest in any crude-oil exploration. Furthermore, PDVSA 
enjoys a monopoly position in the downstream sector as it operates all pipeline, 
storage, and cabotage operations. Technically regulatory functions are divided 
between PDVSA and the ministry, hence the line between the two is blurry and 
there is no independent regulatory body for the oil sector. PDVSA controls about 
80 percent of Venezuela’s oil equivalent production and essentially all refining 
capacity.  
 
The company continues to implement its Plan to Sow Petroleum to sustain and 
expand hydrocarbon revenues. A 25-year plan (from 2005-2030), with main focus 
on exploration in the Orinoco oil belt, a project in which several foreign 
companies have a stake (Ministerio de Energia y Petroleo, 2005). Several foreign 
companies have created partnerships with PDVSA to utilize the Orinoco oil belt 
opportunity, most are however other NOCs rather than IOCs.  
State responsibilities – non commercial activities 
Domestic consumption of petroleum products is heavily subsidized. In 2007, the 
market price for oil products sold in the domestic market was on the order of 
$7.29 per barrel, while the average price of a barrel of oil was $64.70. In 2011 the 
average subsidization rate in Venezuela was 80, 5% and the subsidy per person 
was $ 919,9 and the total subsidy as a share of GDP was 8,6% (IEA 2012).  
 
Noncommercial obligations are estimated, in the most recent annual report, to be 
on the order of $14 billion annually, PDVSA´s transformation under Chavez is 
part of a broader political agenda. The increase in social spending by Chavez is 
mainly funded by PDVSA (Hults 2012:435). There is also a Fund for Economic 
and Social Development of the Country (Fondespa) sponsored by PDVSA, the 
fund is invested in infrastructure, electric power generation, transport systems, 
water systems, housing and education among other things (Ministerio de energia y 
petroleo, 2005). A major downside of all these noncommercial burdens is that 
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PDVSA is unable to make necessary investments in new and existing projects. 
Furthermore, in 2008 the government enacted a windfall profits tax of 50 percent 
when Brent crude rises above $70 per barrel and 100 percent when it rises above 
$100 (Gallegos and Luhnow 2008).  
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation  
The company started as a directorate in the government of India’s Ministry of 
natural resources and scientific research in 1955 and a year later the directorate 
was renamed as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission.  
Corporate Governance 
ONGC is a publicly listed company with the state as the majority owner. The state 
owns 74,11 per cent of ONGC,  foreign institutional investors hold another 8,3 
percent,  individual investors hold roughly 2 percent and the rest is cross 
investment from the Indian oil and gas industry . Researchers claim that many 
aspects of ONGC´s existence today, its structure, behaviour and relations with the 
government has much remained the same since its creation in the late 1950s.  
ONGC is seen as key player in two broad goals of  India’s government, namely  
economic development and self-sufficiency of energy (Madan 2007). The BoD of 
ONGC has five directors; three of these are independent whereas two are 
government representatives (ibid). Furthermore, the strong ties between the 
government and company can for example be seen in the fact that the government 
allocates a large portion of ONGC’s crude production to refiners (the volume is 
specified in MOU’s (Memorandum of Understanding) between ONGC and the 
refiners) (ibid). 
 
The NDA-government which ruled from 1998-2004 decided that ONGC, Indian 
Oil Corporation and the Gas Authority of India had to buy shares in each other 
that previously belonged to teh government. It was a strategic move  to raise 
revenues, however the government always kept at least 51 percent of the shares 
(Madan 2007). Overall India’s energy interest will not trump its broader strategic 
goals and any of ONGC’s international energy initiatives will have to fall in line 
with India’s efforts to become more influential globally (Shegal and Mulraj 2008). 
Company officials admit that one of the major reasons for ONGC’s poor 
performance is lack of access to modern equipment and technology (ibid).   
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Domestic monopoly 
In October 1955 a directive specified that the public sector should dominate the 
oil and gas industry of India, hence that foreign companies would be invited to 
carry out exploration tasks (Mandan 2007).  So it remained until the beginning of 
the 1990s when the Indian government started to pursue a more liberal economic 
policy, which also spread to the petroleum sector (Shegal and Mulraj 2008).  
Around the same time India also went from being a net exporter to once again 
become a net importer. As a result of the more liberal policies 100% foreign 
equity was allowed in private refining ventures and 79% foreign equity was 
allowed in petroleum products marketing in India (Singh and Singh 2004).  
 
The liberalization process started in the downstream sector and in 1997 it spread 
to the upstream sector. The Government approved a New Exploration Licensing 
Policy to attract private and foreign investments in upstream activities through 
tenders, no joint venture agreements with domestic companies were required, 
though sought after by ONGC (Warrier 2008). From 1993-1997, in an effort to 
raise domestic production, the Indian government awarded 28 blocks to private 
companies or joint public-private venture for exploration (Mandan 2007). Today 
ONGC accounts for approximately three quarters of Indian crude oil production 
and two thirds of its natural gas (ibid). 
State responsibilities – non commercial activities 
The government of India controls the pricing of petroleum products in the country 
and intervenes in prices charged by ONGC from state-owned refineries.  
Petroleum prices are kept low and ONGC along with other upstream companies 
are obliged to absorb a third of the subsidiary
6
 burden (Mandan 2007; Gupta, 
Gupta, and Hothi 2011). India ranks fourth on the global ranking of fossil fuel 
subsidization and totalled $ 39, 7 billion in 2011. In 2011 the average 
subsidization rate of oil in India was 18, 6% of the total price and the subsidy per 
person was $ 33, 4 and the total subsidy as a share of GDP was 2, 4% (IEA 2012).  
                                                 
6
 An example; between September 7 2002 and September 7 2005, the price of Dubai crude rose almost 111 percent. The 
retail price of regular gasoline in the United States, during the same period increased 124 percent in India the retail price 
rose only 49 percent (Mandan 2007).  
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Petrobras 
Since 1953 Petrobras has dominated all sectors of the hydrocarbon industry in 
Brazil. Petrobras is internationally recognized for innovation and expertise in deep 
and ultra-deep water exploration and production. The company is listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange since 2000, the Brazilian government owns 50 % of 
common shares and 28,5 % of capital stock.  
Corporate Governance 
Petrobras was established with majority state participation, however the company 
was granted with administrative and financial independence and a commercial 
mandate.  Since 2000, the organizational structure of Petrobras focus on four 
business areas: E&P, downstream, gas and energy, and international, hence also 
involved in non-core activities such as finance and related services (Tordo, Tracy, 
and Arfaa 2011).  The BoD is heavily influenced by the government, with seven 
out of the nine board members connected to Brazilian ministries or agencies.   
However, it is the executive board which to a large extent is independent from the 
government that is responsible for the daily management of the Petrobras.  
Domestic monopoly 
Petrobras is the dominant player in the Brazilian oil industry, in 2008 the 
company produced 98,5 % of Brazils total oil and gas. Petrobras is also active in 
the downstream sector where it operates 11 out of 13 oil refining facilities and 
holds 94 % of Brazil’s reserves.  In addition, Petrobras operates Brazil’s domestic 
natural gas transport system and Transpetro, a subsidiary of Petrobras operates 
Brazil’s crude oil transportation network. 
 
Discovery of new reserves in 2007 triggered new concessions and the government 
chose a competitive model for distributing concessions, hence Petrobras ought to 
have at least 30 per cent stake in the pre-salt layers (Henderson 2012). Even 
though the company has such a dominant market position, the government has 
been careful to create a legal and regulatory framework that ensures Petrobras’s 
focus on commercial operations, as well as the participation of domestic and 
foreign investors.  
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State responsibilities – non commercial activities 
Similarly to the Chinese case, hydrocarbon sector revenues comprised a relatively 
small part of Brazilian government revenues. Taxation on average is about 33 
percent of revenues and Brazil does not subsidize oil consumption. Petrobras have 
been praised for its transparency even though they have not committed to the EITI 
initiative, Revenue Watch gives Brazil the highest rating for reporting, even above 
Norway, which often is seen as the best student in the class. Revenue Watch 
highlights two main factors for the high levels of transparency and reporting; it’s 
legislation for disclosure of public data on government webpage and the National 
Oil Company’s participation in the stock exchange (2013b).  
Trends and findings 
Below trends and findings are presented and clarified along the three dimensions 
discussed above; corporate governance, domestic monopoly and non-commercial 
activities.  
Table 7 Case study results; corporate governance, domestic monopoly and non-commercial activities 
 Corporate governance Domestic monopoly Non-commercial activities 
CNPC -Symbiosis rather than control 
-PetroChina publicly listed 
-Lack of transparency = we don’t 
know 
- Upstream, foreign 
companies invited, difficult 
geology 
- Downstream, duopoly with 
Sinopec 
-  1,5 million employees 
-  Subsidisation 
-  Oil industry Small part of 
GDP 
Saudi Aramco -Western influence, corporate 
structure 
-Saudi culture, secrecy 
-The King has ultimate power 
- Monopoly position - Oil almost 90% of GDP 
- Excessive employment 
- Subsidization, domestic 
consumption almost free of 
charge 
Rosneft -Regaining status as a state agency 
under Putin 
-Since IPO in 2006 more corporate 
governance structure 
- Competitive market 
- Largest Russian oil 
company 
- Unclear, still state 
responsibilities 
- No subsidization 
- State representative 
PDVSA -Since Chavez gained power in 2000 
it’s been a policy arm of ten 
government 
-Monopoly 
- -Open for foreign partners in 
Orinoco belt, only with 
NOCs 
-Responsible for social 
programmes 
-Subsidizing, for domestic 
and Caribbean/Latin 
consumption 
ONGC -Hybrid, state still has some control 
-External investors 
- Competitive 
- Large market share 
- Subsidization 
- Education 
Petrobras -State majority owner 
-Corporate autonomy 
- Monopoly 
- Invite foreign companies to 
raise capital 
- Fund 
- Consistent 
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Table 7 summarizes the findings from the case studies. This analysis is followed 
by an elaboration on what this means for the provision of oil and motives of these 
key players.  
Corporate Governance  
There are two major clusters, the first being PDVSA and Saudi Aramco where the 
government have maintained or increased its governance of the company. It’s fair 
to say that the line between where the NOC ends and the ministry starts is hard to 
define. The second cluster is that of CNPC, Rosneft and ONGC whom all appears 
to be moving more towards a status of partial NOC, like that of Petrobras. Partial 
NOC´s are stock-listed, hence they have the state as a majority owner. A major 
difference between these two clusters is that the former sits on vast reserves 
whereas the others are not exporting with any significance, with the exception of 
Rosneft. Figure 3 visualizes the six NOC’s on a scale ranging from corporate 
autonomy and governance to state control. The arrows below ONGC, CNPC and 
Rosneft indicate their movement toward a corporate structure more like that of 
Petrobras. 
 
Figure 3 Corporate governance 
Corporate autonomy        State control  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Monopoly  
All NOCs analyzed are in a dominant position in their domestic market, with 
some form of arrangement where foreign companies are welcomed in areas where 
domestic actors would benefit from expertise from abroad, with the requirement 
PDVSA Petrobras  Saudi Aramco  
Rosneft  
 
CNPC 
 
ONGC 
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that a NOC must have a stake in the venture. However, we can see two clusters in 
those who have domestic competitions and those who do not. CNPC, ONGC and 
Rosneft have domestic competition created by the state in the past fifteen years. 
Whereas PDVSA, Petrobras and Saudi Aramco have around 95 % of the market 
share in their domestic markets. Figure 4 visualizes the two groups on a scale 
from competitive to a monopoly market set up.  
 
Figure 4 Domestic Monopoly 
Competitive         Monopoly  
 
 
 
 
Non-commercial activity  
Figure 5 Non-commercial activities 
Consistent        Heavy burden   
Transparent         Inconsistent 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
On this dimension there is no clear division among the NOCs. Petrobras is an 
outlier; it does not have large inconsistent non-commercial burdens, whereas 
PDVSA, Saudi Aramco and CNPC are involved in excessive employment and 
other socioeconomic initiatives such as education. The two former are also 
involved in foreign and social policies. Subsidization is traced among all the cases 
except Rosneft; hence the most significant cases are those of countries with vast 
PDVSA CNPC 
Petrobras  
ONGC 
Rosneft Saudi Aramco  
PDVSA  
 
Saudi Aramco  
ONGC 
 
Petrobras  
CNPC  
Rosneft 
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reserves; PDVSA and Saudi Aramco. Another division is that except for Petrobras 
and CNPC, the other company’s revenues play a vital role for their country’s 
GDP. Figure 5 shows the trends above on a scale ranging between consistent and 
small contributions to heavy and inconsistent.  
 
The findings along these dimensions are important because they tell us something 
about the motives and strategies of the NOCs selected. More specifically, they 
help us answer the initial research question set out for this chapter; What type of 
good is oil in the eyes of key drivers of change? Each case analyzed is different; hence 
there are two clusters, firstly the BRICs with Petrobras as the role model and a 
second cluster of resource rich PDVSA and Saudi Aramco. 
Motive for changes 
The BRIC cluster sees oil as a strategic good, a good that is vital for economic 
growth and a necessary tool for further development. Efficiency of the oil sector 
and economic growth is stressed by the states, whom to varying degrees are still 
heavily involved in the steering of the companies. The relationship between 
government and NOC is hard to determine due to transparency issues, hence it 
appears as if the relationship not necessarily needs to be neither top-down nor 
bottom-up but rather one of mutual dependency and strategic collaboration. The 
NOCs have been created to break the entry barriers presented in the previous 
chapter, and this has been possible by help from government. On the other hand 
these companies have helped to increase supplies needed by the government to 
create economic growth and thereby solve the puzzle of security of supply. Still 
inefficiencies are obvious, such as the 1,5 million employees in CNPC.  
 
All in all, due to the lack of transparency and sometimes complicated governance 
structures it is hard to determine the role of the state in these cases. However, 
there appears to be a relationship of symbiosis and mutual benefit between the 
state and corporate objectives. Companies are in need of investments and state 
negotiation power in overcoming entry barriers, at the same time oil is seen as a 
strategic good by the government, oil is needed to be secured for economic 
growth to prosper. Therefore oil has quasi-public good characteristics; the state is 
trying to make the good less of a rival by ensuring that domestic supplies do not 
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run out. Of the goods presented in table 1, oil has traits of a toll good to these 
actors.  
 
In the second cluster, that of resource rich nations, there appears to be more public 
goods motivations for more state involvement. Subsidization has gone as far as 
almost providing oil for free. This can also be seen in a third country of equal 
reserves; Iran.  “Iran leads the world in fossil fuel consumption subsidies 
providing over $ 82 billion from its government resources in 2011 to lower the 
cost of fossil fuels to end users in its country...” (IEA 2012). From this point of 
view it appears as if oil is seen as a natural resource, which should be treated as a 
common pool good. At the same time oil is likely to serve as a way for the 
government to stay in power; by obliging the companies to pay for socioeconomic 
projects, education and employment.  
 
If we go back to the theory of public and private good, this analysis hints that the 
first cluster (BRIC´s) state intervention is mainly motivated by the hope of 
creating a non-rival element to oil consumption, by increasing supply but not 
significantly subsidizing (in an extreme sense creating a toll-good). Whereas for 
resource rich nations, oil is more of a common pool good, where the public 
demand non-excludability of the resource, hence limitations of domestic supply 
makes it rival.   
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5. Integration 
 
Traditionally NOCs have been rather passive players primarily focused on 
granting concessions and negotiating contracts. However in the previous chapters 
we have seen a transformation of these companies into more active market 
players. This chapter is dedicated to visible consequences of the new form of 
NOCs. Consequences are analyzed in the form of vertical and horizontal 
integration. The same cases will be used as in chapter 4 and similarly to the 
previous chapter they will be presented one by one. First a brief introduction to 
integration is given.  
 
Vertical integration relates to the number of market segments that a company is 
involved in. The value chain of the oil market has three major segments: 
Upstream, Midstream and Downstream. There is an abundance of sub-segments; 
hence in order to capture major changes in integration these three segments will 
be used. For each case analyzed there is a table provided showing, which 
segments a particular company was active in at four different points in time; 1995, 
2000, 2005 and 2010.  
 
Traditionally horizontal integration relates to the strategy by a company to merge 
and acquire companies that are active within the same industry and segments in 
order to capture a larger market share. However, horizontal integration can also 
relate to the creation of strategic alliances, these are typically formed in order to 
pursue a common goal and/or to engage in risk sharing (Dicken 2011:156). As the 
analysis below shows, JVs (joint ventures), consortiums and MOUs are all 
common features of the oil market in order to overcome market barriers, risk 
sharing and pooling of investments and capabilities.  
 
Horizontal and vertical integration are tightly linked, strategic alliances 
(horizontal integration) are created in order to cover new market segments and 
value chain expansion (vertical integration) opens up opportunities for further 
alliance building (horizontal integration). Below are the results from the six case 
studies; CNPC, Saudi Aramco, Rosneft, PDVSA, ONGC and Petrobras. The case 
studies are followed by a summary of trends and findings.  
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China National Petroleum Corporation  
Oil consumption rapidly increased in China during the 1980s and 1990s and in 
1993 domestic consumption outpaced domestic production. In 1998 the 
government enforced sweeping reforms to change the Chinese oil industry and to 
enhance Chinese oil companies to be competitive with western IOCs (Jiang 2012).  
 
One of those reforms was a forced swap of assets between CNPC (traditionally 
upstream) and Sinopec (traditionally downstream), the motive behind this reform 
was to create two fully vertically integrated companies. Table 7 visualizes vertical 
integration by CNPC, (for a more detailed overview see Appendix 3).  
Table 2 Vertical Integration, China National Petroleum Corporation 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream   x x x 
Downstream   x x x 
 
As mentioned in chapter four, in the mid 1990s CNPC was one of the first SOEs 
selected to conduct outward investments in Chinese history. This is also visible in 
table 8, where Peru marks the first investment abroad. Furthermore, the previously 
discussed Phase 5 of China’s going abroad strategy is also visible in table 8 from 
2002 and onwards. In this last phase the state is entering a position of both 
encouraging overseas investments and being a facilitator of such strategies, with 
for example backing favorable loans.  
 
Much criticism has been granted towards the Chinese approach, and much of the 
critique is focused on the perceived long-lasting consequences that it may have on 
the developmental model of its trade partners (Beeson, Soko and Yong 2011). 
Chinese oil companies have been criticized for their no-questions-asked policy 
(Taylor 2006:945) clear examples are Iran and Sudan (Jian 2011:15). Also in 
Eurasia, governments supporting Asian NOCs have proven to be more tolerant of 
authoritarian regimes and human rights violations than western counterparts. In 
addition, Chinese companies are accused of exploiting the work force and host 
country laws, on top of that Chinese investments are accused of generating fears 
of mass in-migration (Ziegler 2008:161,162). Whereas other researchers point to 
the fact that Chinese NOCs are making the well needed investments (Taylor 
2006:951) which in turn is helping to increase world supply and capacity (Xu 
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2007:24), so in a sense we are all benefiting from the expansion of Chinese 
economic activity and their ventures abroad (Beeson, Soko, and Yong 2011). 
Table 9 Horizontal integration, China National Petroleum Corporation 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Peru 
Canada
Thailand
Sudan 
Venezuela
Kazaksthan 
Myanmar
Turkmenistan 
Indonesia
Malaysia
Azerbaijan
Oman
Syria
Chad
Algeria
Niger
Russia
Equador 
Tunisia
Mauritiana
Uzbekisthan 
Iran 
Libya
Nigeria
Equtorial Guinea
Turkmenistan
Iraq
Costa Rica
Qatar
Singapore PSC
Canada Service Contract 
Taiwan Aquistion 
Australia Concession
Scotland Strategic alliance
France Joint Venture
Cuba Consortium
United Arab Emirates Purchase agreement
 
Table 9 is based on CNPCs annual reports since 2003 and the following articles 
(Caixinonline 2013; The Wall Street Journal 2013a; Reuters 2011; News 24 2009, 
24; Bloomberg 2010a; Bloomberg 2010b; Reuters 2010b; China National 
Petroleum Corporation 2013b; China Daily 2010; Reuters 2013a; Reuters 2010d; 
Rigzone 2012; Caixinonline 2009; China Daily 2013; The Wall Street Journal 
2013b; Petrochina 2011; Reuters 2013b; Reuters 2010a). 
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There is not only an increase in alliances aboard; the state council has since 1985 
authorized Sino-foreign cooperation in designated onshore areas of southern 
China. In 2011 there were 36 ongoing joint exploration and development projects 
in China. In upstream activities there are many JVs with IOCs such as Shell. 
However in the mid- and downstream sector it is more common to cooperate with 
other NOCs, such as JV-refineries with Saudi Aramco and PDVSA.  
Saudi Aramco 
When Saudi Arabia decided to nationalize its oil reserves and operations Saudi 
Aramco was an upstream company focusing on exploration and production. 
Determined to move into the downstream sector, Saudi Aramco established a 
shipping subsidiary called Vela International in 1984(Saudi Aramco 2012). Today 
Vela is one of the largest crude transporters in the world. In 1993 another 
subsidiary was created, through a merger with Samarec, a Saudi based refining 
company. As table 10 shows, Saudi Aramco has operated as a fully vertically 
integrated company throughout the research period.  
Table 10 Vertical integration Saudi Aramco 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream  x x x x 
Downstream  x x x x 
 
Due to having one of the largest oil reserves on the planet, Saudi Aramco has 
played a major role in the global market for oil for decades. However in the past 
two decades it has also become a major player through alliances and investments 
abroad.  
Table 3 Horizontal integration Saudi Aramco 
1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Korea 
Phillipines
Japan 
United states 
Greece
China
Aquist ion 
Joint Venture
Purchase agreement
M erger 
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A difference between CNPCs and Saudi Aramco’s strategy abroad is that Saudi 
Aramco’s operations abroad are exclusively in the mid and downstream segment, 
particularly in refining and marketing. Table 11 is based on Saudi Aramco’s 
annual reports and the following articles (WorldOil 2013; Reuters 2013g; Saudi 
Aramco 2013). 
Rosneft 
Rosneft was created as a state enterprise in 1993, due to privatizations in the oil 
sector during this period the company lost almost all its assets. Hence as table 12 
indicates, Rosneft always maintained some operations in all segments. By 1995 its 
assets base had been reduced to eight oil producing subsidiaries, four refineries 
and seventeen marketing companies
7. Since that time Rosneft’s expansionary 
activities have mainly been centred on becoming the largest oil company in 
Russia.  
 
When Putin came to power he stated that raw material resources, such as oil 
would be the basis for Russia’s economic growth and put Rosneft as one of the 
tools to achieve this (Henderson 2012). By 2005 Rosneft had re-emerged as a 
major player in the Russian oil sector.  
Table 124 Vertical integration Rosneft 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream  x x x x 
Downstream  x x x x 
 
Rosneft’s broader aim is to become a global company and has started to venture 
abroad. As table 13 shows, Rosneft’s international strategy is in its initial phase 
which mainly focuses on neighbours and former Soviet republics such as 
Kazakhstan (Poussenkova, 2007).  
 
                                                 
7 The September 1995 government Decree #971 determined the new composition of Rosneft. E&P: Purneftegas, 
Sakhalineftegas, Krasnodarneftegas, Stavrpolneftegas, Termneft, Dragneft, Archangelskgeoldobycha, Kalmneft. 
Refining:Komsmolsk, Krasnodarnefteorgansyntez, Tuapse and Moscow. Marketing:Altinefteproduct, 
Severoosefinnefteproduct, Kabbalknefteproduct, Karachaeva, Cherkessnefteproduct, Kemerovoneftaproduct, 
Krasnodarnefteproduct, Krasnodar oil depot, kurgannefteproduct, Murmansknefteproduct, Nakhodnefteproduct, 
Severnefteservice, Smolensknefteproduct, Stavropolnefteproduct, Tuapsenefteproduct, Tamalnefteproduct, 
Masnefteproduct.  
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Table 5 Horizontal integration, Rosneft 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Germany 
Kazakhstan
China
Algeria 
Abakhazia
United Arab Emirates
Service Contract 
Aquist ion 
Strategic alliance
Joint Venture
Purchase agreement
Production sharing contract 
 
In addition to annual reports from Rosneft since 2005, data for table 13 was 
gathered from the following articles; (RT 2013; Rigzone 2010; Rosneft 2013; 
Rigzone 2009c; Bloomberg 2010c).  
Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. 
According to Venezuelan law PDVSA is required to have a minimum of 60 
percent interest in any crude-oil exploration activity within the nation’s borders.  
Furthermore PDVSA operates all pipeline, storage, and cabotage operations in the 
domestic market, including natural gas distribution and related activities (Gallegos 
and Luhnow 2008). Table 14 shows that PDVSA has been a fully vertically 
integrated company during the past decades.  
Table 14 Vertical integration, PDVSA 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream  x x x x 
Downstream  x x x x 
 
Most activities are within the borders of Venezuela; hence the company has made 
some strategic international investments. The last few years PDVSA strengthened 
its ties with China’s CNPC and Cuba, a strategy Chavez claimed to be undertaken 
to decrease dependency on the U.S. (PIW 2012). 
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Table 6 Horizontal integration, PDVSA 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
United States 
Virgin Islands
Domanican Republic 
Brazil 
China
Cuba/ Ecuador
Aquist ion 
Strategic alliance
Joint Venture
Purchase agreement
Table 15 is a compilation of  information from official PDVSA documents and 
articles including; (China Daily 2005; Corrales and Romero 2013; PDVSA 2013; 
Oil and Gas journal 2009; Bloomberg 2013; El universal 2012b; Reuters 2012; El 
universal 2012a; Reuters 2009). In comparison with other NOCs PDVSA has not 
acquired many assets nor engaged in many joint ventures abroad. One of the few 
assets held outside Americas, Ruhr OEl refineries in Germany were sold to 
Rosneft in 2010.  
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
ONGC was traditionally an upstream company whereas Indian Oil Company, 
since its creation in 1959 was the downstream major. Overtime both companies 
have been vertically integrating and hold cross shares (Mandan 2007).  
 
Even though vertically integrated, ONGC differ from the other NOCs presented in 
this thesis due to the lack of significant holdings within the marketing and 
distribution segments. In 2003 ONGC acquired 71,62 percent of the Mongalore 
refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MRPL), marking an important step 
downward in the value chain. MRPL sources its crude from a variety of domestic 
and international supplies. Among international suppliers are Saudi Aramco, 
National Iranian Oil Company, Yemen and Nigeria (Mandan 2007). Table 16 
shows ONGCs steps towards becoming a fully vertically integrated company by 
the mid 2000s.  
Table 7 Vertical integration, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream   x x x 
Downstream    x x 
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ONGC’s international operations are mainly carried out by its subsidiary ONGC 
Videsh Ltd (OVL). OVL has made the most investments abroad in absolute terms 
of all Indian companies, by 2007 acquisitions abroad accounted to between $5-6 
billion. One of OVL's stated strategic objectives is to source 20 million tonnes of 
equity oil from abroad per annum from 2018. In the long-term OVL aims to six-
six fold its production by 2030 (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2011). 
ONGC has many subsidiaries and joint ventures not only in the oil sector but also 
in for example LNG and natural gas
8. ONGC’s overall corporate strategy is built 
on four pillars;  increasing domestic E&P, improving recovery, integration and 
diversification and international as we can see in table 17 (Mandan 2007). 
Table 8, Horizontal integration, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
M yanmar 
Libya
South sudan 
Sudan
Colombia
Brazil
Russia
Kazakhstan
Azerbadjian
Iraq
Vietnam 
Syria
Cuba
Nigeria
Venezuela
Aquist ion 
Concession
Strategic alliance
Joint Venture
Consortium
Production sharing contract 
 
The table above is based on information from ONGC’s  website as well as a 
variety of articles ; (Reuters 2010e; Bloomberg 2008; The Wall Street Journal 
                                                 
8 ONGC is also a partner in a number of joint ventures It has a 12,5 percent stake in Petronet LNG Ltd, which owns and 
operates a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at Dahej in western India and is building another terminal at Kochi in the 
south. The other partners are IOCL, GAIL, BPCL and Gaz de france. ONGC also has a 23 percent interst in Petronet MHB 
Lts, the owner and operaterof  the Mangalore-Hassan-Bangalore pipline (with HPCL and Petronet India Limited). The 
ONGC Tripura Power Company is another one of the ONGC’s joint ventures (with the state gov. of Tripura and IL  & FS). 
The company in which ONGC has a 26 percent stake, will run a natural gas-based power-generating project. In addition, 
ONGC has a 21,5percent stake in Pawan Hans helicopters Ltd, which among other things, provides helicopter service to its 
offshore facilities. ONGC also has stones in three special economic zone (SEZ) projects in the country. 
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2013c; Reuters 2013a; The Business Standard 2012; Offshore 2013; Business 
Standard 2010; Times of India 2010; The Economic Times 2003; The Wall Street 
Journal 2012; Reuters 2010d; The Economic Times 2013; Reuters 2012b) 
Petrobras 
Petrobras was created as a SOE with majority state participation. From the start 
the government granted Petrobras a commercial mandate as well as administrative 
and financial independence. Participation in joint ventures, both domestic and 
international, was encouraged already from the start as a process of learning. 
Since 2000 the organizational structure of Petrobras focus on four business areas: 
E&P, downstream, gas and energy, and international. (In addition two support 
areas; financial and services.). Petrobras is the dominant player in the Brazilian 
market. In 2008, Petrobras produced 98,5 % of Brazils total oil and gas 
production, Petrobras operates 11 out of 13 oil refining facilities and holds 94 % 
of Brazils reserves.  In addition, Petrobras operates Brazil’s domestic natural gas 
transport system and Transpetro, a subsidiary of Petrobras operates Brazil’s crude 
oil transportation network. This situation is expected to continue, especially since 
a new legal framework was established in June 2010, following large discoveries 
in a pre-salt offshore area near Rio de Janeiro. Two bills approved by the 
Brazilian congress underline a fundamental policy change with respect to control 
over, and access to, the country’s petroleum resources. Table 18 shows that 
Petrobras has been a fully vertically integrated company since the 2000s.  
Table 9 Vertical integration, Petrobras 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream x x x x 
Midstream   x x x 
Downstream  x x x x 
 
Petrobras was commencing its international operations already in 1972, when it 
entered the Colombian market. Another early bird was Angola, where operations 
started in 1979 and since 1993 also a wide presence in Argentina. Table 19 shows 
a vast increase in international operations and horizontal integration from 2003 
and onwards. 
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Table 10 Horizontal integration, Petrobras 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
M exico 
Colombia
Bolivia 
Uruguay 
Libya
United states
Chile
Gabon
Benin 
Peru 
Nigeria 
Venezuela 
Angola
Tanzania
Turkey 
Namibia
Portugal
Japan 
Singapore
China
Portugal 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Service Contract 
Aquist ion 
Concession
Strategic alliance
Joint Venture
Product ion sharing contract 
 Table 19 is based on data from Petrobras website and complementary articles; 
(Mecropress 2005; People’s daily 2010; The Economic Times 2008; The Wall 
Street Journal 2013d; Latin Trade 2012; Macauhub 2007; Oil and Gas journal 
2003; Reuters 2011d; Reuters 2012c; Bloomberg 2013b; Rigzone 2007; Reuters 
2013d; Reuters 2011b; Reuters 2013f; Rigzone 2009b; Bloomberg 2011; Oil and 
Gas journal 2005; Rigzone 2009a; Reuters 2011a; Reuters 2013c; SubseaUK 
2013).  
Trends in NOC integration 
The NOCs analyzed are a diversified group of companies; hence over the past two 
decades they have developed some similar characteristics and strategies. In the 
early 1990s these companies were specializing in upstream operations and in 
some cases regulatory activities inherited or appointed by host governments.  
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Vertical integration  
During the 1990s vertical integration was in focus, either led by the company 
itself or by the government, in most cases a combination of the two. Liberalization 
processes of domestic markets such as in China, Russia and India, created new 
opportunities and constraints for the traditional set up of the industry, which led 
CNPC, ONGC and Rosneft to take on new strategies. PDVSA, Petrobras and 
Saudi Aramco were the companies that were vertically integrated already at the 
start of the period analysed but have taken very different paths since. PDVSA’s 
attention and capital has been drawn to non-commercial business activities 
whereas the Petrobras and Saudi Aramco have geared attention and capital to 
more specialized business activities. The former has focused on offshore drilling 
and the latter in domestic R&D and overseas refining and marketing. At the end of 
the day, they may have taken different routes to get there but by 2012 we are 
looking at six vertically integrated They may have taken different routes to get 
there, The result however, is at in 2012, we have six fully vertically integrated 
companies. 
Horizontal integration  
No matter whether primarily economically or politically motivated, the rise of 
partial NOCs has created a new dynamics in the industry. New alliances are born 
between consumer nations wanting to move upstream and producer nations whom 
are moving downstream. As previously discussed due to the peculiarities of oil, 
changes require time and financial stamina. Hence in the past decade and 
particularly after the financial crisis the BRIC countries are in a position to 
perform such strategies due to its financial reserves. "The Chinese ability to 
integrate oil and gas investments with general development loans and 
infrastructure investment has proved especially popular with governments in some 
African countries. A new scheme offers the possibility of cross investment with 
Middle East producers, allowing equity in the national downstream against 
upstream developments" (Keun-Wook Paik et.al 2007:4).  
 
Already from the start of the 1990s these NOCs started to seek horizontal 
partnerships, alliances and assets. However, a common trend is a vast increase in 
these from the mid 2000s, once fully vertically integrated they have looked abroad 
to form new alliances, formed partnerships and acquired assets to capture market 
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shares in other countries. Assets are acquired in South America, Asia and Africa 
but also some in Europe and North America. There is no clear trend that alliances 
are exclusively formed with other NOCs, however as the number of NOCs 
venturing abroad increase so does the alliances in-between them.  
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6. Increased competition through state interaction  
 
The 4
th
 era of the oil market is in a process of development, it is too early to 
conclude its final structure. Hence the previous chapters help us understand how 
and why the international oil market is structured the way it is today and this 
structure has some important implications. Old market and government failures 
have been solved and others have been created or worsened. This chapter focuses 
on tangible characteristics of the brewing 4
th
 era; first a recap of the findings in 
previous chapters and thereafter a discussion on the implications of these findings 
for the present and possibilities for the future.  
Findings 
From chapter three, four main conclusions were drawn regarding the market 
conditions of the oil market; first there has been a growth in demand for oil, in 
particular from developing and emerging economies. Secondly, the most 
significant entry barrier to the oil market is regulatory access by host governments 
of vast reserves. Third, after a long period of increasing prices, price volatility has 
been damaging for both supply and demand actors. Lastly, lack of transparency in 
the oil industry has been a major issue throughout the 2000s, even though 
institutional initiatives have been taken, key actors are not reporting to a 
satisfactory level. Furthermore six NOCs were identified as being part of the new 
key drivers of these changing market conditions and these were selected for case 
studies.  
 
In chapter four we learnt about new key actors of the 4
th
 era, namely NOCs of the 
BRICs and countries holding vast reserves. These NOCs are different from their 
traditional passive predecessors; many of them are developing a hybrid 
connection to the state, where the line between the state and the company is 
vague. This hybrid form of private-public partnerships has proven successful in 
overcoming the entry barriers, such as regulatory measures of access and 
investments and from the governments point of view these NOCs have helped to 
increase security of supply. Furthermore these NOCs often enjoy a privileged 
position the domestic market.  However, with rare exception these new giants are 
obliged to non-commercial activities in their home economy, creating barriers to 
expansion both domestically and abroad. In addition chapter four concluded that 
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there are two main clusters of NOCs in terms of their perception of oil as a good. 
The first cluster sees oil as a strategic good due to the significance of oil to 
economic prosperity. Whereas the other clusters, which are NOCs owned by 
governments holding vast reserves tend to act as if oil was a common pool good 
for its citizens.   
 
As a consequence of the strategies pursued by these new key actors we have seen 
some visible consequences in the market structure. The NOCs analyzed have all 
successfully pursued strategies of becoming fully vertically integrated companies. 
Once fully vertically integrated, they have looked abroad for new opportunities 
through horizontal integration. These strategies are in most cases a combination of 
commercial and state initiatives. In chapter five the main conclusion is that 
domestic and international expansion is taking place both vertically and 
horizontally, increasing competition in the international oil market. Table 20 is a 
replication of table 2 which was presented in chapter 1, with our new insights 
included.  
 
Table 20 Eras of the oil market  
Era Key actors  Good Motive  Consequence 
Post war period  Seven sisters Strategic  Security of supply Demand side 
capture economic 
rent 
1970s- 1980s OPEC Strategic  Nationalism, 
economic rent, 
politics  
Supply side capture 
economic rent 
1980s-1990s BP, Shell, Exxon 
etc.  
Private good Efficiency  Market 
concentration, 
volatility 
2000s Net importer NOCs 
/ NOCs with vast 
reserves 
Toll / common 
pool 
Economic growth 
/domestic politics 
Increased 
competition / Lack 
of transparency 
 
All in all, we have new key actors, with a new approach to the oil market. 
However, this is not to say that they are the only key actors but they are the new 
key actors. We are still in the making of this paradigm and it is too early to say its 
final structure. The new key actors appear to believe in state intervention as a tool 
to overcome barriers such as lack of investments and security of supply as well as 
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a tool to provide oil as a good. Below I will elaborate on the implications of table 
20.  
Implications of the new players  
During the past decade, we have seen NOCs play an increasingly larger role in the 
global oil market, many variations exist hence in particular we have seen two 
large groupings of NOCs; traditional and partial NOCs. Traditional NOCs have 
strong ties to the government and often part of a wider strategic and economic 
perspective. Whereas partial NOCs are a hybrid form of traditional NOCs and 
more commercially driven IOCs. These two groups of companies are likely to be 
key drivers of the new oil era, the former due to its vast reserves and the latter for 
increasing both the demand and supply of oil. This is not to say they are the only 
actors that matter in the new era, hence they are key drivers in that they are new 
key drivers and therefore are interested in a change and possess capacity to drive 
that change.  
 
Below I will elaborate further on four implications of the findings above. First of 
all, the partial NOCs were in part created to overcome the market failure of 
imperfect competition. This has lead to a more competitive oil market where 
alternatives to the giant IOCs are increasingly available. Secondly, the fact that we 
see more NOCs with at times dubious reporting standards and no-questions asked 
policies can be argued to increase another market failure, that of imperfect 
information. Transparency and imperfect information keep reappearing in the 
discussion and history of the oil market, may it be so that this is an inherent trait 
to the oil market. Thirdly, traditional NOCs, increasingly treat oil as a quasi-
public good, this have consequences both for the domestic population and the 
market as a whole, it is creating a government failure, through inefficient 
allocation of resources. This leads to an under investment in future and current 
capacity and lock-in effects of oil consumption. Lastly, the emerging partial 
NOCs see oil as a strategic good, which in a sense repair the government failure. 
This chapter is concluded with some thoughts on the future, where global 
governance and fragmentation, ironically appear to be two possible routes 
forward.     
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Repairing market failure - Increasing competition  
In the 1990s we saw the (re)creation of the super IOCs, through mergers and 
acquisitions some of the world’s largest corporations were born. Competition 
authorities were concerned with the development, if mergers and acquisitions 
would have continued for much longer we might have ended up with one major 
company.  
 
Meanwhile the BRICs have had tremendous economic growth since the mid 
1990s. As oil is the engine of the economy, it would only be natural for them to 
also be involved in a larger share of the oil market. A dilemma occurred; how 
were their companies supposed to compete with the IOC giants? The solution was 
help from the state. This solution, I argue helped repair the market failure of 
imperfect competition.  
 
Competition they created, chapter five showed how NOCs have been able through 
a mix of state-intervention and commercial goals to become vertically and 
horizontally integrated companies and increasingly of a global character. This is 
not to say that IOCs have lost their importance on the market, they are still highly 
valued for their expertise and often seen as clusters of knowledge and 
investments. From the analysis in chapter 5 we see that even though there is an 
increase of NOC-NOC alliances when venturing abroad, they often partner with 
IOCs in projects requiring frontier engineering and technology. Another 
opportunity for IOCs is the increase in demand which has increased the price of 
oil and thereby also made very costly projects such as the Arctic feasible.  
 
The constraints of IOCs are in a sense the complete opposite to those of NOCs. 
The lack of state interference gives them corporate and financial autonomy and 
lack of non-commercial burdens give them a competitive advantage. However, the 
increased competition from NOCs has complicated negotiations with host 
governments where they IOCs have a competitive disadvantage in not being able 
to offer the same loans or benefits. In addition, IOCs have a competitive 
disadvantage in not having a domestic monopoly. As discussed in the previously 
NOCs are new alternatives and they open up for new alliances and collaborations. 
Hence there are also NOCs with strong political ties that avoid IOCs, as means of 
being sceptical to former imperialists, they now have an alternative 
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Creating market failure – imperfect information 
During the past decade there has been an intensifying concern for the lack of 
transparency in the oil market. The concern is based on three main aspects; how 
much oil exists? Where does the economic rent go? And an emerging concern 
with regards to bilateral agreements that fragment the global market.   
 
As for the latter two concerns the reporting standards of the majority of the NOCs 
studied are questioned. Furthermore, as these NOCs have spread through the 
global value chain there is an increased chance for a drop of oil to be taken out of 
the ground and pass through the entire value chain without passing through any 
actor that by regulation is obliged to publish data to the public. Therefore, one 
market failure may have been solved but one may have been created (or in at least 
worsened), namely that of imperfect information.  
 
However I would like to add that these NOCs, just like the market itself, are in a 
development process. The relationship between state and NOC is different in each 
case and may be about to take another turn, perhaps one of separation, perhaps 
not. It appears if they have looked around for best practice transfers and 
companies like Petrobras and Statoil seem to have been studied. If this is the path 
chosen, the issue of imperfect information may slowly be erased. The role models 
may also have some skeletons in the closet, but in oil market terms they are 
praised for their transparency by Revenue Watch and similar organisations.  
 
As with regards to concerns of peak oil and the amount of reserves in the ground; 
we have never known and most likely will never know. This fact is not only a 
result of unwillingness, but also a due to lacking capacity. Voluntary and 
cooperative efforts as well as regulatory measures have increased reporting 
standards of countries and companies. However, most facts are very difficult to 
verify. Consumers and citizens of producer countries would benefit from more 
sharing of best practices, a successful case often highlighted is Statoil. Best 
practice transfers are trying to be revealed through EITI for example, hence the 
fundamental problem may lay in the undemocratic practices where the state and/or 
elite do not see an incentive to publish data. So in a sense, just as with the so 
called resource course it does not necessarily have to be the oil itself but rather 
undemocratic forces that surrounds it that creates these failures.  
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A brewing institutional network of transparency has put pressure on both state and 
market actors to become more transparent both in voluntary and regulatory terms.  
There has been resistance from both camps, so in a sense it is both a government 
and a market failure to create complete information. Furthermore, during a 
conference this past month Klare also highlighted that this lack of information is 
not a new problem (2013), these practices have been done by western companies 
since the seven sisters, hence the concern may be new. 
Repairing government failure – oil as a toll good  
As previously stated, we have seen an increase in NOCs belonging to net 
importers of oil. For these actors oil has traits of a toll good, the government is 
trying to create a good which should be close to non-rivalry to its consumers. And 
the states have helped NOCs in global shopping sprees to increase supplies.  It is a 
good which provision is to vital to the functioning of the economy to be left 
entirely to market forces, yet it is increasingly seen as excludable as finances are 
directed towards increasing supply rather than subsidizing consumption.  The 
creation of these partial NOCs are seen as the most efficient allocation of 
resources to provide the strategic good and repair for previous market 
arrangements which has not been able to efficiently provide the good to these 
countries, they are in a sense repairing for old government failures.  
Creating government failure - oil as a common pool good 
In those countries with vast reserves, Russia being the exception, oil appears to be 
close to a common pool good. The public is enjoying close to free consumption of 
oil, subsidization rates have exploded and can be as high as 80% of the price. This 
courtesy has increased the use of oil, see for example table 2, it creates a lock in 
effect. For example we can see countries like Saudi Arabia climbing the lists of 
top consuming countries. Furthermore this often leads to poor re-investment rates, 
in the recent weeks we see countries like Mexico having to open up for 
international investments, not only to increase production but also to maintain a 
stable supply (PIW, 2013).  
 
Instead of reinvesting in production capacity and expansion have to spend revenue 
on subsidization. This paired with a limited market access from foreign actors 
have led to a lack of investments. Oil as a strategic good in the view of resource 
holders makes access to new resources increasingly difficult. As in the previous 
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section, this development also adds to the debate on resource nationalism and an 
increased concern for transparency in the market.  
The future road; global governance or regionalization?  
It is impossible to predict the future; however I would like to end this thesis with 
some thoughts about what these implications may mean for the future of the oil 
market and the brewing 4
th
 era of the oil market. Furthermore, as pointed out in 
the section on public and private goods in chapter one. Changes to the oil market 
is fairly slow compared to other markets of other commodities, it can take a 
decade from the time when a decision to make an investment is made to the fact 
that we have oil drops coming out of the ground. However, there appears to be 
two opposing, yet not mutually exclusive scenarios. One where we see an 
increasingly fragmented market, such as the regionalization we have seen in the 
international gas market and another where we see an increase in global 
governance of the oil market and the emergence of an international regime.  
 
Due to the different logistics of oil, as compared to gas, a fragmentation does not 
necessarily have to be based on geographical criteria. Rather, it would be based on 
needs and as a way to avoid volatility in prices, exchange rate risks and a way to 
secure supply/demand. A phenomenon that strengthens the fragmentation 
argument is the emergence of bilateral purchase agreements between consumer 
and producer NOCs/governments. We may see more bilateral agreements between 
consumer NOCs wanting to secure supply and exporting NOCs wanting to secure 
(a non-transparent) income.  In addition, volatility in prices has increased the 
rationale for substitutes, in particular for unconventional sources. For example the 
development of unconventional sources in the U.S. has now started to pay off and 
this is a trend that could further increase the fragmentation argument. 
 
Another possibility is that we will see more robust forms of global governance 
emerge. An increase in the number of actors, an increased complexity, a concern 
for transparency and perhaps foremost a concern of price volatility on both sides 
of the supply chain have triggered calls for a more interconnected global 
governance.  To date there has not been created a rigid regime that has the 
capacity to involve all market actors. Traditionally much dialogue has been 
centred around IEA and OPEC, hence as the last decade has passed those 
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countries and companies outside this dialogue have increased their significance 
both on the supply and demand side. The IEF has emerged as a major dialogue 
between consuming and producing nations. However, the failure to be able to 
incorporate key players such as China, India and Russia, may lead to a collapse or 
at least less significance of that dialogue. As for now we do not have a clear 
hegemonic power of the oil market and this may also be the reason for the lack of 
a clear and leading regime.   
 
The future is uncertain, leaving external factors apart, we can see trends of both 
fragmentation and an increase of global governance. Which will be the stronger 
trend or if they can co-develop only time can tell.  
Conclusion 
The international oil market is in a period of transformation, for the past decade 
fundamental market mechanisms have changed. There has been an increase in 
large demand side players, entry barriers have increased, transparency issues have 
received attention hence little action, but the free market exchange remains as the 
price setter of oil. From analysis of these mechanisms, key drivers of change were 
identified as National Oil Companies of emerging economies and countries with 
vast reserves. Six of these were selected for case studies and it became apparent 
that they had adopted different relationships to their host governments and 
markets. However some trends were visible, such as public good characteristics in 
the provision of oil as well as hybrid state-private partnerships to create vertically 
and horizontally integrated companies that are competitive with International Oil 
Companies. The 4
th
 era of the oil market is still in the making and whether it will 
be one of more global governance or more fragmentation is yet to be seen.  
Insofar we can conclude that old market and government failures of imperfect 
competition and inefficient allocation have been replaced by a worsening of 
others, such as imperfect information.  
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Appendix 1 – JODI  
Table 21 JODI reporting assessment, submission 
2012 2010 2009 2008 2 007 2 006 20 04
Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Ango la 1 1 1 3 2 3 3
Argentina 2 1 1 1 1 2 n/a
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Bahrain 1 1 1 2 2 ... ...
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Belg ium 1 1 2 2 2 2 3
Bo livia 2 1 n/a n/a 3 3 n/a
Brazil 2 1 1 1 2 1 n/a
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 3 2 2 3 2
China 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Chinese Taipei 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Co lombia 3 1 1 1 2 2 n/a
Congo ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Cos ta Rica 3 1 1 1 1 1 n/a
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Czech Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dominican Repub lic 2 3 1 1 n/a 3 n/a
Ecuado r 1 1 1 1 3 3 n/a
Egyp t  2 2 2 2 3 3 2
El Salvado r 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Es tonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland  1 2 2 2 2 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gabon n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
Grenada n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Guatemala 3 3 2 1 1 3 n/a
Guyana 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Hait i n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Honduras  1 3 1 1 1 1 n/a
Hong  Kong , China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland  1 1 1 1 1 1 2
 
Description 
1 = Good 
2 = Fair 
3 = Poor 
n/a = not submitted 
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Iran 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Iraq  1 1 1 1 3 3 ...
 Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Kazakhs tan n/a n/a 1 1 3 1 1
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kuwait  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Libya n/a 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malays ia 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Malta 1 1 1 n/a n/a 3 ...
Mexico  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Myanmar n/a n/a 1 1 3 3 1
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 New Zealand  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nicaragua 3 2 1 1 1 3 n/a
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oman 1 1 1 1 n/a 3 1
 Panama 1 3 1 3 n/a 3 n/a
 Papua New Guinea 1 1 3 1 1 3 3
 Paraguay 1 1 1 1 3 1 n/a
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Philipp ines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Po land  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Po rtugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Russ ian Federat ion 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Saud i Arab ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
 Singapo re 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Slovak Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Suriname n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Switzerland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Syria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trinidad  & Tobago  1 1 3 3 n/a 1 n/a
Tunis ia 1 1 1 ... ... ... ...
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ukraine 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
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Table 11 JODI reporting assessment, timeliness 
2012 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 200 4
Algeria 3 2 3 3 2 2 3
Ango la 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
Argentina 1 3 3 3 2 3 n/a
Australia 3 3 2 2 1 1 3
Austria 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 2 1 1 ...
Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 3 ...
Barbados  3 3 n/a n/a n/a 2 n/a
Belg ium 1 1 3 1 1 3 3
Bo livia 3 3 n/a n/a 3 3 n/a
Brazil 1 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Brunei Darussalam 3 2 1 1 1 3 3
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
China 2 3 1 2 3 2 3
Chinese Taipei 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Co lombia 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Congo ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Cos ta Rica 3 3 2 3 1 1 n/a
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Czech Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 2 1 1 3 1 2 2
Dominican Repub lic 3 3 3 3 n/a 3 n/a
Ecuado r 1 1 1 1 3 3 n/a
Egyp t  1 2 3 2 3 2 1
El Salvado r 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Es tonia 1 1 1 1 3 2 3
Finland  1 1 2 1 1 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Gabon n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 3 1 1 3 3
Grenada n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Guatemala 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Guyana 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Hait i n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Honduras  3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Hong  Kong , China 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Iceland  1 1 1 1 2 1 2
Ind ia 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Indones ia 1 1 1 2 3 1 1
 
Description 
1 = Good 
2 = Fair 
3 = Poor 
n/a = not submitted 
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Italy 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Jamaica 2 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kazakhs tan n/a n/a 1 2 3 2 1
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kuwait  2 1 1 1 1 1 2
Libya n/a 1 1 1 3 3 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malays ia 1 1 3 3 3 2 3
Malta 1 2 2 n/a n/a 3 ...
Mexico  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 2 .... ... ... ... ... ....
Myanmar n/a n/a 1 1 3 2 1
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 New Zealand  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nicaragua 3 2 3 3 3 3 n/a
Nigeria 2 1 3 3 3 3 3
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oman 1 1 1 1 n/a 3 3
 Panama 3 3 3 3 n/a 3 n/a
 Papua New Guinea 1 3 3 1 3 3 3
 Paraguay 2 2 2 3 3 3 n/a
Peru 1 3 3 2 3 3 3
Philipp ines 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
 Po land  1 1 1 1 1 1 2
 Po rtugal 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Russ ian Federat ion 1 2 1 2 1 3 2
Saud i Arab ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Singapo re 1 3 1 1 1 1 3
Slovak Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 3 3 3 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Suriname n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Sweden 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Switzerland  1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Syria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Thailand 1 2 1 1 1 1 3
Trinidad  & Tobago  2 3 3 3 n/a 3 n/a
Tunis ia 1 3 2 ... ... ... ...
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Ukraine 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
United  Arab  Emirates  3 3 2 1 2 2 3
United  Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United  States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
Venezuela 1 1 2 1 1 3 3
Vietnam n/a 3 3 1 3 1 3
Yemen n/a n/a 3 2 3 1 1
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Table 12 JODI Table 23, JODI Reporting assessment, completeness 
2012 2010 20 09 2008 2 00 7 20 06 2 00 4
Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Ango la 1 1 1 3 2 3 3
Argentina 2 1 1 1 1 2 n/a
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Bahrain 1 1 1 2 2 ... ...
Barbados  3 3 n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Belg ium 1 1 2 2 2 2 3
Bo livia 2 1 n/a n/a 3 3 n/a
Brazil 2 1 1 1 2 1 n/a
Brunei Darussalam 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cameroon ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 3 2 2 3 2
China 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Chinese Taipei 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Co lombia 3 1 1 1 2 2 n/a
Congo ... ... ... ... ... ... 3
Cos ta Rica 3 1 1 1 1 1 n/a
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Czech Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dominican Repub lic 2 3 1 1 n/a 3 n/a
Ecuado r 1 1 1 1 3 3 n/a
Egyp t  2 2 2 2 3 3 2
El Salvado r 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Es tonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland  1 2 2 2 2 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gabon n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
Grenada n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Guatemala 3 3 2 1 1 3 n/a
Guyana 3 n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Hait i n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Honduras  1 3 1 1 1 1 n/a
Hong  Kong , China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ind ia 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
 
Description 
1 = Good 
2 = Fair 
3 = Poor 
n/a = not submitted 
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Iran 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Iraq  1 1 1 1 3 3 ...
 Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jamaica 2 2 1 1 2 3 n/a
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kazakhs tan n/a n/a 3 3 3 3 2
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kuwait  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Libya n/a 1 2 2 2 2 1
Malays ia 3 2 2 2 2 2 3
Mexico  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Myanmar n/a n/a 1 1 3 3 1
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 New Zealand  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nicaragua 3 2 1 1 1 3 n/a
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oman 1 1 1 1 n/a 3 1
 Panama 3 3 1 3 n/a 3 n/a
 Papua New Guinea 1 1 1 2 1 3 3
 Paraguay 2 1 1 1 3 3 n/a
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Philipp ines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Po land  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Po rtugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Russ ian Federat ion 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Saud i Arab ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 Singapo re 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Slovak Repub lic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Suriname n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 n/a
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Switzerland  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Syria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 3
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Trinidad  & Tobago  2 1 3 3 n/a 1 n/a
Tunis ia 1 1 1 ... ... ... ...
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ukraine 2 ... .. ... ... ... ...
United  Arab  Emirates  2 2 2 2 2 2 1
United  Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United  States  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 2 3 1 3 1
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Appendix 2 – EITI 
Table 13 EITI compliance 
Country Year Comment
Albania 2009
Azerbaijan 2003
Burkina Faso 2008
Central African Republic 2006 suspended
Republic of the Congo 2004
Ghana 2004
Iraq 2009
Kyrgyz Republic 2004
Liberia 2008
Mali 2006
Mauritania 2005 suspended
Mongolia 2006
Mozambique 2008
Niger 2005
Nigeria 2002
Norway 2008
Peru 2004
Tanzania 2009
Timor-Leste 2008
Yemen 2005 suspended
Zambia 2008
Afghanistan 2008 Candidate
Cameeroon 2002 Candidate
Chad 2007 Candidate
Cote d'Ivoire 2006 Candidate
Democratic Republic of Congo 2007 Candidate but suspended
Guatemala 2009 Candidate
Guinea 2005 Candidate
Indonesia 2009 Candidate
Kazakhstan 2005 Candidate
Madagascar 2007 Candidate but suspended
Sao Tame and Principe ... Candidate
Sierra Leone 2006 Candidate but suspended
Solomon Islands ... Candidate
Tajikistan ... Candidate
Togo 2009 Candidate
Trinidad & Tobago ... Candidate
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Introduction to Research Topic   
Few commodities are as fundamental to economic development and 
industrialisation as oil. Nearly all of our modern activities are indirectly or directly 
connected to oil either by transport, manufacturing or heating. There are certainly 
alternatives in the making, hence transitions in energy are slow and willingness to 
do so is doubtful. "While alternative energy sources are increasing, hydrocarbons 
are still projected to dominate energy supply through at least 2030" (National 
Petroleum Council 2007). As the main source of energy it is important for 
consumers, producers and policy makers to understand how this good is governed. 
Previous research have left gaps in the literature, gaps that are important to fill in 
order understand the oil market. Such as understanding the perception of oil by 
key players and what the new market conditions means for non-state actors.  
 
This master thesis aims at contributing to the collective knowledge of oil market 
governance and National Oil Companies (NOCs). It intends to do so by asking 
fundamental questions that yet have not been answered in the existing literature. 
First of all by asking and answering the question of what happened in the 2000s, 
is there more political governance now than it was a decade ago. Furthermore, I 
try to answer how and why by analyzing whether oil is perceived as a public, 
private or strategic good by the new majors. Secondly, by asking how strategic 
choices by NOCs affect the supply chain.  
 
My ambition is that this thesis will be able to give some constructive input to 
actors who try to understand what types of changes are happening in the oil 
market. Changes in the market will have implications for all actors along the 
supply chain from the citizens of host governments, via companies and states to 
the end consumer. Even though I cannot predict the future, I hope to be able to 
give a picture of where we are now and how and why we got here.  
 
Because this is a master thesis, certain constraints such as time and financial 
resources exist, for these reasons I will not be able analyze every detail of every 
actor. In addition, there are constraints pertaining to the topic such as language 
barriers and lack of transparency. Acknowledging the constraints, I still believe 
that the data available is rich enough to present general trends in the oil market 
and more specific contribution on key players. 
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Literature Review 
This literature review attempts to serve three purposes; present a historical 
overview of the main changes in oil market governance, introduce the main 
debates of the last decade and to summarize the main characteristics of the oil 
market today. The aim with this chapter is not to give a theoretical review, but 
rather to summarize what we know and don’t know about the oil market and its 
governance. The history of the oil market is long and every twist and turn would 
not possibly fit in this chapter. Therefore more emphasis is put on debates and 
issues closer to today whilst still summarizing the major shifts in the past.   
The history of oil governance 
The beginning of oil  
Oil production took off in the United States in the mid 1850s, hence this literature 
review has its starting point at the end of WWII and therefore the prewar structure 
will to a large extent be left untouched. However, the most extensive 
documentation of the period can be found in Yergin’s book The Prize: The epic 
quest for power, money and oil. In great detail the author guides the reader 
through the rise and fall of Standard Oil, the importance of Baku, how oil changed 
the WWI, the clever maneuver of Mr. five percent and the adventure of 
Rockefeller. Furthermore Yergin explains the prevailing model of the American 
oil industry at the middle of the century. The underlying assumptions of that 
system were that the demand for oil would not be significantly sensitive to price 
movements and that each state should have its natural share of the market. 
However, due to the uncontroversial nature of this period we quickly move to the 
post-WWII world.  
State-centrism in the postwar oil market  
After WWII the importance of oil and its significance to power and economic 
growth was realized among politicians across the globe. Oil had changed the rules 
of war and became a matter of winning or losing. During the war, tremendous 
efforts were assigned to securing oil supplies to your own army as well as cutting 
your enemies supply.  
 
The decades following the war were dominated by a state-centered approach in oil 
market governance. First it was dominated by International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
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from the Western world and later by producer government’s trough the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Yergin 1991:500). The 
widespread drive towards state intervention in the oil market following WWII was 
mainly supported by three arguments among the OECD countries; market failure, 
the Keynesian legacy and the Soviet example (Stevens 2008). In more general 
terms a state-centered approach is based on two assumptions. The first assumption 
is that in some cases protectionism can raise social welfare. Whereas the second 
assumption states that governments can operate independent from interest group 
pressure (Oatley 2012).  
 
The seven sisters 
 
In 1948 the U.S became a net importer of oil and the western world (including  
Japan) were dependent on IOCs to supply sufficient supplies of "foreign oil" to 
cover domestic demand (Yergin 1991). The  most important IOCs in securing that 
supply came to be called the seven sisters and in the immediate period after the 
WWII they were the majors of the global oil market (Claes 2001). The steady 
increase in demand and low production costs in the Middle East generated great 
profits for the seven sisters and security of supply for western governments.  
 
The seven sisters were the "Anglo-Iranian oil company, the four Aramco partners- 
Jersey, Socony, Texaco and Standard of California- plus Gulf, which was Anglo-
Iranian’s partner in Kuwait; Shell, which was tied to Gulf in Kuwait; and the 
French company, CFP. The American and British governments were also 
intimately involved" (Daniel Yergin 1991:476).What they had in common was 
that they all were involved in large scale joint ventures in the Middle East and 
through a consortium they controlled almost the entire industry. The Seven sisters 
controlled the entire upstream segment and host governments were mainly 
perceived as passive players engaged in the industry as competing sellers of 
licenses or oil concessions. However in the downstream segment in the domestic 
western markets competition over consumers could be fierce (Fattouh and Van der 
Linde 2011: 26). 
 
In the decades to come resource rich nations developed a state centered approach 
that would have vast consequences for the seven sisters. Already before the WWII 
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a new form of resource nationalism had started. For example, in 1938 the 
nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry and the creation of Pemex would come to 
serve as a role model for other resource rich countries across the globe (Jaffe och 
Soligo 2010). In addition there were three other factors that were very important 
for how the industry would develop; the rise of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over 
natural resources, dissatisfaction with the concession terms agreed in the previous 
period and rising oil demand (Stevens 2008). 
 
The main battle between these two "blocks" (seven sisters and host governments) 
was about economic rent. Rents had a much greater meaning to many of the host 
governments than its meaning in pure financial terms; it was also a matter of 
sovereignty and nation building. Host-governments were eager to show the world 
and in many cases its own population the power, influence, significance and status 
these resources gave the country. This was an opportunity to build a strong nation-
state based on power and pride (Yergin 1991:431).  For the consuming nations 
that had put their faith in the hands of the IOCs joined the battle for strategic 
reasons. They all understood that they needed to secure supplies of oil in order to 
grow economically and for many oil was also a great source of direct and indirect 
taxes (Yergin 1991:433). 
 
There was a great dissatisfaction among the producing countries over the 
distribution of profits from the industry. In many cases IOCs paid more in taxes 
on consumer markets than they did in royalties to host governments. An event that 
really marked a shift in the battle was the Saudi-Aramco fifty-fifty deal in 1950. 
When the Saudi-Aramco deal was struck it opened up a door for new 
arrangements in the distribution of rents. The era of the seven sisters were broken 
down by several factors, increased competition, lack of unity and the argument 
that has received the most literature; the establishment of OPEC.  
 
The era of OPEC 
 
The major reason for the creation of OPEC was a growing anger towards the 
international oil companies. IOCs were cutting posted prices simultaneously as it 
was the posted price that was the basis for the producer countries taxes and 
royalties (Claes 2001). In a Gentlemen´s agreement leading up to the creation of 
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OPEC, a leading figure, Perez Alfonzo urged that the concerned countries should 
defend the price structure and establish NOCs. It was also urged to build domestic 
capacity to move further along the value chain, in particular downstream and into 
refining. 
 
A major shift in power in OPECs favor happened in 1971, there were two 
agreements signed between OPEC members and IOCs that year. They marked a 
significant shift because they covered topics such as tax and price increases, 
inflation compensation and fixing of such rates for future years. "The effects of 
the agreements were a 21 percent price increase for Saudi Arabian crude (from 
$1.80 to $2.18), and an increase in revenue of 38.9 percent"(Claes 2001:63).  
 
The nationalization of resources in the 1970s was in many cases also rooted on a 
much deeper level. Both the creation of NOCs and the creation of OPEC was for 
Latin American, African and Middle Eastern producing countries a way to affirm 
their independence in relation to foreign interests and an assertion of 
independence (Noreng 2006). The postwar period did not only see an increase in 
demand but also in supply. In the beginning of the 1970s most nations in which 
supplies were found created a NOC. By October 1973 producer governments took 
over the prerogative of oil prices and unilaterally announced increases to the price, 
this was the first oil shock (Stevens 2008). 
 
In October 1973 the first Oil crisis spread across the globe. It was a result of 
OPEC´s, Syria´s and Tunisia´s response to the third Israeli-Arab war through a 
proclaimed oil embargo; it was “in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the 
Israeli military”. The embargo lasted until March 1974 and during this period the 
price of oil increased from $3 to $12 per barrel. The oil embargo signaled a new 
era for oil and the years that followed, 1974-1978 can be seen as the golden years 
of OPEC (Daniel Yergin 1991).  
 
From 1983-1984 OPECs role as a price setter started to be diminished for two 
major reasons; first, a halt in oil demand due to the economic downturn and a 
huge inventory dump which now was considered unnecessary and  secondly new 
producer competition outside of OPEC (Claes 2001). In March 1982 OPEC 
reduced its quota in order to maintain the price, but it was the end of an era. 
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Furthermore, the way that OPEC influenced the oil market in its golden years and 
up until the mid 1980s can be characterized by price setting whereas since 1986 
the strategy has been producing quotas (Wirl 2012).  
Oil as a private commodity 
In the 1980s there was a shift towards a more market oriented approach. "As was 
said, sometimes with approval and sometimes with horror, oil was becoming, just 
another commodity "(Yergin 1991:721). Oil was no longer considered a strategic 
good which had to be under state control, but rather a commercial commodity 
with private good characteristics. The Washington consensus and the fall of the 
Soviet Union finalized the arguments for privatization and deregulation. The 
Washington consensus symbolized an ideological swing away from government 
involvement in the economy and the oil market.  Furthermore there were 
arguments that NOCs had the potential to become too powerful in domestic 
politics (Stevens 2008). The early 1980s can be seen as the shift away from a 
statist paradigm and towards a liberal paradigm based on deregulation and 
privatization of the oil industry. The new policy agenda was to make oil a private 
good governed by free market exchange (Goldthau 2012).  
 
The era of liberalism conquered the western world and with it came a wave of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), some of which were large energy 
companies (Parra 2010). Furthermore NOCs were criticized for being ineffective 
due to conflicting objectives imposed by governments and rent seeking 
bureaucrats (Stevens 2008). "The development of new oil in Alaska and the North 
Sea played an important role in the recovery of many companies as significant 
market players, helping them to regain some of their market power in the rather 
stagnant oil market of the late 1970s and first part of the 1980s."(Fattouh and Van 
der Linde 2011:39) 
 
The market as price setter 
 
During the 1980s the entire pricing system had changed, in the late 1970s crude 
sales were nearly exclusively long-term contracts whereas by 1985 seventy 
percent of sales were based on spot price (Claes 2001). Saudi Arabia started to 
pursue netback pricing and the futures and forward markets exploded; this meant 
at least in the short term that it was market traders that decided the price of oil.  
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By mid 1980s North Sea crudes, particularly Brent, was a major feature of an 
increasingly price-transparent market. Parra argues that this was visualized in two 
trends, firstly the Dated Brent was a feature of making the spot market an 
integrated part of the supply channel and secondly  Brent became a “marker” 
crude. Contract prices of other crudes came to be fixed by reference to the price of 
Brent, subject to appropriate adjustments for quality and location (2010). From 
1987 Saudi Arabia started to set crude prices monthly in advance according to a 
formula. World oil prices has since been set by reference to the prices of the 
marker crudes; Brent, WTI and Dubai. Furthermore Parra argues that OPEC still 
played a role in price setting but now without precision. OPEC continued to set 
producing quotas, but the effectiveness and outcome was highly uncertain. As for 
demand, it did not reach back to peak levels until 1989.   
 
The Gulf War was a turning point in producer-consumer relations, most likely 
because it proved how sensitive the global market still was to such supply shocks. 
On October 1, 1990 in the UN General Assembly, the Venezuelan President Perez 
called for an urgent meeting of producers and consumers. He claimed that the 
arrangement at the time only would favor speculators and opened up for a 
dialogue between OPEC and IEA. The first meeting took place in Paris in the 
summer of 1991 and these meeting are now held on an annual basis under the 
name of the International Energy Forum (IEF) (Fattouh and Van der Linde 2011: 
59).  
 
Market concentration  
 
Throughout the 1990s both financial and physical reserves were to be 
concentrated among fewer companies. This trend of mergers and acquisitions 
intensified at the turn of the next decade; from 45 IOCs in 1998 only 16 remained 
in 2004(Claes 2001:85). What had unfolded in these years was the largest and 
most significant remaking in the oil history since 1911. The companies that came 
out of mergers were not only bigger but also capable of larger and more complex 
projects than ever before (Yergin 2011:105).  In conjunction and correlated with 
the industrial concentration three realities appeared. First there was a growing 
importance of attracting FDI as the basis of development strategy. Secondly, a 
low oil price following from the collapse in 1986. Thirdly it was manifested that 
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oil from now on would be coming out of a much more difficult geography and 
geology (Stevens 2008).  Another trend in the industry was streamlining, which is 
the process where company´s focus on the core business, in this case oil, gas and 
chemicals (Parra 2010).  
 
The 1990s also opened up new opportunities, in particular the opening of the 
Soviet Union. The Caspian basin offered great opportunities for development and 
today this region produces four times of what they were just a decade ago. “Today 
the total output of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is 2.8 million barrels of oil, 
equivalent to more than 80 percent of North Sea production”(Yergin 2011:82). 
A new millennium  
The state regains control 
In the early 2000s a new paradigm was in the making, even though the market as a 
price setter to a large extent remains, the literature indicates more state 
intervention than in the previous decade. For example, large oil exporters like 
Russia and Venezuela has since the beginning of the new millennium entered a 
stage of re-nationalization and upcoming exporters such as Chad and Uganda have 
created NOCs to govern new supply (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). 
Furthermore, China became a net importer of oil and its NOCs are now 
considered global giants.  
 
Every year the consultancy company Ernst & Young presents the main 
opportunities and risks in the oil market. For 2011 access to reserves was listed as 
the main risk followed by political constraints and competition for proven 
reserves. "Indeed, our multi-sector survey found that oil and gas respondents were 
more likely than those in any other sector to report difficulties in managing the 
risks associated with the expansion of government’s role"(Ernst & Young 
2011:4). 
 
National Oil Companies  
 
The main tool of a state wishing to interfere with the oil market is by creating a 
NOC. In the past five years there have been several studies of NOCs; here I would 
like to highlight three that have influenced the recent debates on the topic. In 2007 
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the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy conducted a series of in depth case 
studies on a range of NOCs. The presentation of the case studies entailed the 
following six conclusions. Firstly, NOCs have noncommercial objectives that 
differ from IOCs objectives, for example; redistribution, foreign and strategic 
policy, energy security, wealth creation for the nation, domestic politics and 
economic development. Secondly the extent to which the noncommercial 
objectives govern the behavior of a NOC has a huge impact on its ability to 
replace and expand its oil and gas production. Thirdly, the institutional structure 
and regulatory framework can make a NOC much more effective. It reduces the 
impact of noncommercial activities upon the core business and in addition, 
multiple NOCs can improve the efficiency. Another point which the study 
revealed was the importance of international capital markets in facilitating 
corporate responsibilities. A new trend was also discovered; NOCs have long 
been excluded from downstream and marketing segments in consuming markets, 
however lately NOCs have been seeking to gain market share in these segments 
and by doing so creating opportunities for new strategic alliances between NOCs 
and IOCs. Finally, the study emphasized the growing importance of NOCs in the 
global oil market and that this should be of concern for importing countries in 
particularly concerning insufficient reinvestment rates and responses to vertical 
integration.  
 
A second study was published by the World Bank in 2011, it focused on value 
creation among NOCs. Four particular questions were asked and answered in the 
study. Firstly, internal governance structures appeared to be more important than 
external. Furthermore, there is a tendency for NOCs that are wholly owned by 
their governments to have more national missions to oblige and thereby have 
fewer incentives to improve efficiency. However, cultural differences explain why 
similar corporate governance structures may function in a dissimilar way. 
Secondly, the study concluded that large resource endowments are a disincentive 
to efficient production, hence that it is the manner in which they are exploited that 
matters. Thirdly, they found that sheltering a NOC from competition by 
restrictions on access helps the NOC to focus on developing necessary 
competence and economies of scale. Hence, such measures can have decreasing 
effects on value creation over time. And finally, they concluded that national 
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mission objectives hamper value creation when their pursuit is in conflict with 
other value added functions (Tordo, Tracy and Arfaa 2011).  
 
The third study was conducted by PESD (Program of Sustainable Development at 
Stanford University) and published in the book Oil and Governance: state-owned 
enterprises and the world energy supply. First of all this study asks why a NOC is 
created and maintained and what they found was; fear that IOCs were not 
delivering adequate revenues and benefits, nationalism, contribution to  the 
nation’s industrial base and lastly for NOCs to take over from IOCs when the 
risky part is over. Another research topic was what influenced the performance of 
a NOC. The study found that state goals, geology and consistency in the state-
NOC interactions to be important indicators of a NOCs performance. 
 
Or maybe not?   
In the first decade of the 2000s there were also NOCs taking an opposite 
approach; Norway, China and Brazil has for example partially privatized their 
national giants(Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). As previously mentioned, during 
Putin’s time in office Russian energy companies underwent a form of 
renationalization. This may still be true for the gas giant Gazprom and some other 
energy companies, hence in the last few years the oil giant Rosneft appears to be 
taking steps to reduce government influence (Henderson 2012:53). 
 
In addition European countries have recently received some attention for their 
lack of state interference in the oil market. The debate often belongs to a wider 
debate of whether or not the EU should have a common energy policy and 
whether it is nation-states or the European commission that should provide energy 
security. European companies have found themselves in fierce competition with 
both producer NOCs and Asian investors (Youngs 2009:169). Some argue that the 
so called new “resource nationalism” gives the EU a reason to protect itself, not 
necessarily by creating NOCs but at least to take a more active role (Umbach 
2010:1239). This could also be a space for improved of economic and political 
integration that strengthens cohesion of its members. However to date the EU 
institutions have not played a role in securing this strategic resource, and 
European vulnerability is far too high(Palazulelos and  Fernandez 2012:280).  
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Investments  
In the report from Ernst & Young mentioned above, the three main opportunities 
in the oil industry were frontier acreage, unconventional sources and conventional 
sources in challenging areas as the three main opportunities (2011).  All of these 
are very investment intensive, even in relative terms for the oil industry. This 
coupled with the fact that almost all current reserves are under the control of 
NOCs, leads to an under investment.  Several scholars argue that in many 
exporting countries, the relationships between the states as owners and NOCs are 
too complex and inefficient and this yields very low rates of investment in the oil 
sector. For example, revenues from the oil industry that could be used for 
reinvestments are instead used to subsidize domestic oil prices (Jaffe and Soligo 
2010). Furthermore more, the financial crisis thought to have affected the rate of 
investment negatively both by lowering the oil price and secondly by general 
precaution towards investments and credit constraints (Fattouh and Van der Linde 
2011:103,127).  
Peak oil and resource scarcity 
Hubbert developed his theory of peak oil already in the 1950s, hence still today it 
is a very controversial topic. The term peak oil refers to the point of maximum 
global production, however the debate of whether this point is reached, ever will 
be reached or already has past is continuous. A popular modification of the model 
is to call it peak cheap oil, meaning that oil with relatively cheap production costs 
will no longer be found. So there is no lack of resources as such but rather that the 
new discoveries will be found in very tricky geology and in unconventional 
sources (Noreng 2012:121).  
 
Peak oil is connected to our perception of how scarce resource oil actually is. No 
matter whether the scientists or economists (or perhaps both) are right, the debate 
has created concern in the political community as how to ensure energy security, 
here a sufficient supply of oil. "Energy security exists when there are energy 
sources large enough to meet the needs of the political community (the energy 
demands), which include all military, economic and societal activity. Those 
sources must be able to deliver such quantities of energy in a reliable and stable 
manner and for the foreseeable future. As soon as these conditions are not met, 
there exists a problem of energy (in) security"(Raphael and Stokes 2010:379).  
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Actors have different views upon how such security should and can be achieved. 
There are two main approaches a more liberal or a more realist approach. For the 
liberal actor, energy security is best solved by interconnecting economies and to 
create interdependencies. "As long as this economic order exists, conflict between 
major powers over energy resources is highly unlikely" (Raphael and Stokes 
2010:383). According to previous paragraphs this may be exemplified by the acts 
of the European Union. Whereas resource nationalism can be interpreted as the 
realist response and most of the attention in the current debate on resource 
nationalism has been granted to China."A more objective idea of the supply of oil 
on the market, however, encourages a more mercantilist approach to securing 
preferred positions in the competition for oil. China is an example"(Noreng 
2012:39). Where a mercantilist strategy is one built on partnership between the 
state and companies involved. The state’s financial resources are used to ensure 
long-term access, in this case, oil from primarily in Africa and the Middle East. 
However many argue that the reinforced urge to protect national interests hardly is 
exclusive to China (Beeson, Soko and Yong 2011).  
 
This review previously touched upon some debates regarding NOCs, another 
trend closely related to this topic and that of resource scarcity is the rise of the so-
called importing NOCs and their growing importance on the oil market. Importing 
NOCs seek to acquire reserves and invest in properties abroad to supplement 
inadequate domestic supplies (such as China and India) or because domestic 
supplies are largely nonexistent (as in South Korea or Japan) (Ziegler 2008:134). 
Some argue that the consumer NOCs of Asia resembles the characteristics of the 
seven sisters in the middle of the past century(Harks 2010).  
Asia, in particular China  
The emerging economies of Asia and in particular China are widely argued to be 
of more importance in the brewing paradigm. They are likely to become the new 
rule-makers in terms of supply, access and sustainability. This does not 
necessarily mean that the OECD countries will be excluded from the oil market, 
rather that they now will become rule-takers rather than rule-makers (Goldthau 
2012). Some scholars predict that with the power shift in international economics 
from the U.S. to China we will also lead to a change in the chosen currency of 
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pricing oil. Either by an absolute change in currency or through a basket of 
currencies (Noreng 2012:121).  
 
China´s economic and political expansion and growing importance appears to 
have caught the attention of oil market analysts. Some emphasize negative side 
effects of Chinese energy companies’ strategies such as human rights violation 
and lack of transparency. Whereas others point to the fact that Chinese NOCs are 
making the well needed investments (Taylor 2006:951) which in turn is helping to 
increase world supply and capacity (Xu 2007:24), so in a sense we are all 
benefiting from the expansion of Chinese economic activity (Beeson, Soko and 
Yong 2011). 
 
Much of the criticism towards the Chinese approach is focused on the perceived 
long-lasting consequences that it may have on the developmental model of its 
trade partners (Beeson, Soko and Yong 2011). Chinese oil companies have been 
criticized for their no-questions-asked policy (Taylor 2006:945) clear examples 
are Iran and Sudan (Jian 2011:15). Also in Eurasia, governments supporting Asian 
NOCs have proven to be more tolerant of authoritarian regimes and human rights 
violations than western counterparts. In addition, Chinese companies are accused 
of exploiting the work force and host country laws, on top of that Chinese 
investments are accused of generating fears of mass in-migration (Ziegler 
2008:161,162).  
 
But on the other hand, the American and European activity in oil-rich nations may 
not be that of strong ethics either. Non-democratic governments have been 
supported by major powers and their oil corporations for a long time. Attempts to 
correct social injustice created by these arrangements have been forcefully shut 
down in order to ensure stability and secure supply (Raphael and Stokes 
2010:387). 
 
Another debate that has received a lot of attention is to what degree Chinese 
NOCs are policy tools of the Chinese government or whether they have strategic 
autonomy. There is no doubt that there is a growing demand for oil in China and 
that this in conjunction with China becoming a net importer of oil has triggered 
Chinese companies to venture abroad in order to supply the domestic market. On  
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the one hand some argue that this going abroad strategy is mainly a result of a 
more capitalistic China in rapid economic growth with companies that see market 
opportunities (Jian 2011:3).  
 
Whereas other arguments point to government strategy, since around 2000 and up 
until the financial crisis Chinas energy security policy was characterized by the 
slogan “go abroad”. Later on, in the years following the financial crisis Chinas 
policy has turned into “go abroad and buy”. The crisis gave China new 
opportunities to utilize its large foreign exchange reserves and expand its 
investments in the global market (Jian 2011). Therefore, one could say that the 
relationship between many Asian NOCs and their host governments is rather 
symbiosis than control (Ziegler 2008:162). Many scholars agree to the fact that it 
is both commercial objectives and government strategies that drive this form of 
energy diplomacy, hence some argue that NOCs are in the driver seat (Goldthau 
2010). Other researchers emphasize that Chinese NOCs are still very tied to the 
Chinese culture and political system. And that a transition towards more 
internationalization and autonomy for the company might be coming but that such 
a transition will take decades (Xu 2007:25).    
 
No matter whether primarily economically or politically motivated, the rise of 
Asian NOCs has created a new dynamics in the industry. New alliances are born 
between consumer NOCs wanting to move upstream and producer nations whom 
are moving downstream (Fattouh and Van der Linde 2011:8). For a consuming 
nation it requires stamina and money to be able to move upstream (Parra 2010), 
hence after the financial crisis China is in a very particular position due to its 
financial reserves. "The Chinese ability to integrate oil and gas investments with 
general development loans and infrastructure investment has proved especially 
popular with governments in some African countries. A new scheme offers the 
possibility of cross investment with Middle East producers, allowing equity in the 
national downstream against upstream developments" (Keun-Wook Paik et.al 
2007:4).  
Increasing price  
In the past 40 years the oil price has risen by 780 % in real terms, this in 
comparison with other minerals which only have managed a 50 % increase 
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(Radetzki 2012). Some argue that the price performance can be explained by the 
cartel behavior of OPEC and the increasing costs of production at least in the 
short-run. Whereas other such as Radetzki argue that the reason is that almost all 
proven oil reserves today belong to NOCs and that their investment rate is too low 
because of host governments whom use the rents from oil production to pursue 
other goals than increased capacity (2012). Whereas others simply blame the 
increased demand from emerging economies (Harbo 2008:42). And some believe 
that financial speculators played a major role (Yergin 2011). It may be a 
combination of all factors, but no matter which one is the strongest, it is clear that 
in the period from 2002 to 2008 the oil market underwent its longest period to 
date of sustained price increases, reaching peaks not seen before (Fattouh and Van 
der Linde 2011). However in the years following the crisis we have seen an 
intensified price volatility (Harks 2010). This recent volatility in prices has had a 
negative impact on investments  and in addition it triggers opportunistic behavior 
on the part of whoever has the temporary advantage (Bressand 2010). 
 
Not only did the financial crisis bring a fall in oil prices it also brought a shift of 
power in the international economy from the U.S. to China which may in the 
future lead to other changes for the price of oil. Noreng elaborates on the topic; 
China is becoming the most important trading partner of many oil-exporting 
countries and this together with the rising convertibility of the Yuan may well 
lead the way for pricing oil Chinese currency in the future (Noreng 2012:22).  
Specialization  
The previously mentioned report by Ernst & Young proposed that the major 
opportunities in the industry in 2011 belonged to frontier acreage, unconventional 
sources and difficult geology. These opportunities do not only require investments 
but also they require specialization. "A combination of high oil prices and limited 
access to reserves has pushed many oil companies in non-OPEC countries to 
explore new frontiers" (Fattouh and Van der Linde 2011: 102). New frontiers can 
be found in ultra deep waters along the Brazilian coast, under the melting ice of 
the Arctic and in unconventional sources. According to a latest EIA International 
Energy Outlook; "global production of unconventional liquids will increase from 
3.4 mb/d in 2007 to 12.9 mb/d in 2035, accounting for 12 percent of the world’s 
total liquids supply in 2035". 
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Strategic Alliances  
As mentioned in the previous part, there are new alliances and dynamics in the 
making. There has been an increase in strategic alliances both between NOCs and 
between NOCs and IOCs (Xu 2007). "This period (2000s) witnessed the 
renegotiation of contract terms and conditions for many projects which signaled a 
shift in the balance of the relationship between NOCs and IOCs. Contracts 
between NOCs and services companies grew in size and importance over the 
same period" (IEF 2012:4). 
 
Hence, one should recall that it is not only NOCs that benefit from partnering up. 
Today the share of oil reserves available for IOCs is very small, its considered to 
be less than 10 percent (IEF 2012:5). This may be something to consider for 
consuming countries whom are reliant on IOCs for external supplies (Palazulelos 
and Fernandez 2012:279). According to PIW´s yearly rankings 17 of the 25 
largest oil companies today are NOCs. In addition, its suggested that service 
companies are taking over the many tasks from IOCs (IEF 2012:7). In addition, 
NOCs like Statoil and Petrobras have become industry leaders worldwide within 
their specific expertise (Henderson 2012:45). Still IEF claim that IOCs are the 
preferred partners for long-term ventures,  in addition to technology and finance, 
IOCs bring a package of operational expertise and project management 
capabilities as well as market knowledge and access (2012:7). 
 
Previously much of the dialogue between consuming and producing states and 
companies has been centered between IEA and OPEC. However, the new 
millennium has seen the rise of the new consumers and producers. On the demand 
side in particular Asian countries and on the supply side new fields were resources 
were developed in Africa and Caspian Basin. This means that the emerging key 
players are not in the old debate, they neither belong to IEA nor OPEC. And these 
new players have different interests, aspirations and perceptions of the energy 
challenges (Fattouh and Van der Linde 2011:86). The IEA has in later years been 
reaching out for a dialogue with new consumers such as China and India, hence 
interest of membership has been fairly low both from the newcomers and existing 
members (Kohl 2010).  
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Summary of the 2000s 
In sum the first decade of the millennium has meant vast changes for the oil 
industry. However, it appears as if research still has not reached consensus as to 
what is going on. With regards to political interferences, we do see some more 
involvement than in the 1990s but we cannot claim that it is the same statist 
approach as was seen in the post WWII era, it may be a new form of state 
intervention (Goldthau 2012). Producer and consumer NOCs have reached the 
attention of researchers whom are trying to fill the knowledge gaps of these 
organizations. It is argued that these originations do not provide the sufficient 
investment in capacity building that is needed to meet the rising demand. At the 
same time research on peak oil triggers debates on whether we have reached 
maximum production capacity as well as debates related to resource scarcity and 
resource nationalism.  
  
For the first nine months of 2012 Asian NOCs spent $ 37 billion acquiring assets 
outside their home market and there are no signs of slowing down (Ernst & 
Young 2012:1). Asia and in particular China has been mentioned several times in 
this review. There is no doubt that China will play a more important role in world 
politics in the years to come and thereby also in energy politics. Throughout the 
past decade China´s ‘going out’ strategy has received particular attention and  
there is still confusion as to how the relationship between the state and Chinese 
NOCs actually is functioning. Furthermore what impact these companies have on 
host governments. "It is argued that Chinese oil diplomacy in Africa has two main 
goals: in the short term, to secure oil supplies to help feed growing domestic 
demand back in China; and in the long term, to position China as a global player 
in the international oil market."(Taylor 2006:938) 
 
The situation described above appears to have triggered new dynamics and 
relationships in the oil market, new risks and opportunities appear for all actors 
involved. Some implications of the new dynamics are yet to be discovered. Hence,  
what we do now is that the 2000s has brought a continuous increase in the price of 
oil followed by a few years of increased volatility. The reasons for the increase 
appears to be many and there are wide debates as to which are the most important. 
Furthermore, scholars wonder what implications the new dynamics will have for 
Europe and IOCs. It is debated whether the EU should approach the oil market 
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with a more realist approach as opposed to the liberal approach taken (Youngs 
2009:181).  
 
Research Questions and design  
The objective of this thesis is to provide an understanding of major changes in 
governance of the oil market and to analyse how and why these changes occurred. 
In order to do so the following chapters will try to answer the following questions:  
  
1. Is the oil market characterized by more political governance today than it was 10 years ago?  
2a. Why has it changed? What type of good is oil in the eyes of key actors? 
2b. Is there more vertical integration than previously and is the vertical integration NOC driven?  
2c. Are we seeing more NOC-NOC alliances? If so, what does this mean for the role of IOCs?  
 
The questions and their related research design are organized into two parts. The 
first part pertains to the question of political governance and free market 
constraints. Whereas part two covers case and comparative studies that will 
answer the why and how questions.  
Part 1 – Governance  
Is it more political governance of the oil market compared to 10 years ago? 
The intention here is to be able to capture recent changes and in the governance of 
the global oil market. In economic theory a commodity left entirely to market 
forces will have it’s price and quantity determined by the equilibrium of supply 
and demand. Another possibility is for a commodity to be politically governed; 
hence political governance can come in many different shapes.  It may therefore 
be easier to look at what the market would look like if it was a free market. The 
perfect market hypothesis says that a commodity is in perfect competition of free 
trade if the following characteristics prevail:  
 
1. A homogenous good  
2. Multiple actors on both demand and supply side (No monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly etc.) 
3. All participants have the same information.  
4. Low barriers to entry  
5. All participants are price takers  
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When all these conditions are in place, we have perfect competition according to 
economic theory. From now on, I will treat them as indicators (I), due to that the 
first condition has not changed in the past two decades I will treat it as a constant. 
Leaving me with the following four indicators:  
  
I1 = Multiple actors  
I2 = Information  
I3 = Entry barriers  
I4 = Price takers  
 
If these were true I would except to find the following facts: If there is a wide 
range of actors then it should be possible for consumers to diversify their supply 
and for producers to sell to a variety of consumers. If information was available to 
everyone, it should be easy for me to find information regarding for example 
reserves and production rates. The most significant entry barrier that I found in 
my literature review was government policy and therefore this will be used as a 
measure to see whether barriers have increased or decreased.  Lastly, if both 
supply side and demand side actors are price takers, if no actor alone can change 
the price by disrupting supply or change the demand.   
 
I will try to look at the market as a whole, look at general data regarding the 
industry and when company or country specific data is need I will look at the 
major producer and consumers. The idea is then to compare the results at four 
different times in order to capture changes. The format for collecting, organizing 
and analyzing data will follow the outline in table 1.  
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Table 1. Indicators, measurements and time periods for research question 1 
Indicator  Measurement  1995  2000 2005 2010 
(2012) 
I1 = Multiple actors  
 
Measure: Number of 
suppliers and consumers 
for a particular country 
    
I2= Information  
 
Measure: Was/Is 
information on reserves 
and production 
available 
    
I3 = Entry barriers Measurement: 
Government policy  
    
I4 = Price takers 
 
Measurement: 
Supply/demand 
disruptions/increases 
    
 
Already now I expect that there was neither a free market a decade ago nor today. 
But what I might find is that the state-centered approach might have changed and 
that some indicators may have decreased whereas others have increased. I have 
already conducted some preliminary research on a few actors in the market and it 
confirmed my notion that I will find different but intensified political interference 
in the oil market. By using the variables of the free market, I expect to be able to 
find not only whether the state has more control over the oil market, but perhaps 
more interestingly on what variables it changes over time. This information will 
be very helpful in part 2 where I try to answer the questions of why and how.   
Part 2 – Goods and strategies  
2a Why has it changed? What type of good is oil in the eyes of key actors? 
Why is there a different approach from states today compared to 5,10 or 15 years 
ago? From the analysis in part one, I expect to get an idea of what has changed 
and who the actors are that account for these changes. I expect that these actors 
are National Oil Companies and possibly governments controlling them. I will 
select 5-10 companies that appear to be driving the change(s) and perform case 
studies on these. Primarily I will try to understand why it has changed and this will 
be done by looking at what the motive or the goal of the state policy behind the 
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NOC. A useful tool for doing this will be by looking at how governments view 
oil, is it a public, private or strategic good?  
 
The second question is then how? There are two main ways in which NOCs can 
expand their influence either by vertical integration or by building strategic 
alliances which from now on will be referred to as horizontal integration.   
2b Is there more vertical integration in the oil market today than 10 years ago? 
And if so, is the vertical integration NOC driven? 
There are three major segments
9
 in the value chain of the oil market:  
 
       Upstream                               Midstream         Downstream 
 
 
 
If a company is pursuing a strategy of vertical integration, they try to capture more 
segments than previously, for example a company that historically have been 
involved in Exploration in the upstream phase, decide to move into the business of 
refining the crude oil (transformation). In order to answer the question at hand, I 
will analyze several companies and their non-or-existent paths of integration.   
 
Dependent variable: Vertical integration  
Independent variable: Number of segments per company  
 
This section will be a comparative study of the same periods used in the first 
question as well as a comparison between IOCs and NOCs.  
2c Who are the NOCs trading with, are there more NOC-NOC alliances? What 
will happen to IOCs?  
Strategic alliances are formal agreements between firms to pursue a specific 
strategic objective; to enable firms to achieve a specific goal that they cannot 
achieve on their own by horizontal integration. It involves the sharing of risks as 
well as rewards through joint decision making responsibility for a specific 
venture. Three major models of horizontal integration exists; research oriented, 
                                                 
9
 These major segments can further be subdivided into many sub categories. 
Inputs  Transformation   Distribution  Consumption 
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technology oriented and market oriented. Alliances offer the following (potential) 
advantage to participants:  
- Overcoming problems of access to markets  
- Facilitating entry into new/unfamiliar markets  
- Sharing increasing costs, uncertainties and risks of R&D and of new product 
development  
- Gaining access to technologies 
- Achieving economies of synergy, for example by pooling resources and 
capabilities and by rationalizing production. (Dicken 2011:156) 
By performing a similar study to that in 2b I will try to map the horizontal 
integration at different times and comparing whether it appears to be NOC or IOC 
driven.  
 
Above is the main structure, hence I am aware that I will have to deepen the 
economic theory for the entire part two. In addition to the existing literature 
review, there will be an additional part covering the concepts of free-market, 
goods, vertical and horizontal integration. 
 
Data 
 
Data will be gathered from a wide variety of secondary sources. For first part I 
will use the three case studies on NOCs mentioned in the literature review; James 
A Baker Institute, the World Bank and PESD. Another important source will be 
annual reports from companies, consultancies and journals; Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly, BP statistical review, Mckinsey and  Ernst & Young to name a few. But 
also more academic journals such as Journal of Energy policy will be consulted. 
Furthermore industry reports from organizations such as International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and the U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA) will be 
useful.  
 
As we move on to the second part of the study and the proposed case studies, 
more data will be needed in addition to the ones mentioned above. Here the 
annual reports from the selected companies (and perhaps their main trading 
partners) will be thoroughly analyzed. Also government reports will be useful in 
analyzing government policies. Here is also where some problems may appear, I 
expect that the case studies are likely to belong to companies/countries that use a 
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different language than what I can master. I am aware that language, transparency, 
time and financial barriers may pose some constraints to the availability of data.  
But at the same time I’m confident that I will obtain sufficient amount of quality 
data to perform the research proposed in this report. I have already looked into 
some possible help with translation of foreign documents, such as government and 
company reports in Chinese, Arabic, Russian or Spanish (what is needed will 
depend on cases chosen). Furthermore, even though not confirmed there appears 
to be possibilities for some funding from related research projects at the Central 
European University. 
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